Key management for beyond 5G mobile small cells: a survey by De Ree, Marcus et al.
SPECIAL SECTION ON ROADMAP TO 5G: RISING TO THE CHALLENGE
Received March 22, 2019, accepted April 25, 2019, date of publication May 1, 2019, date of current version May 17, 2019.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2914359
Key Management for Beyond 5G Mobile
Small Cells: A Survey
MARCUS DE REE 1,2, GEORGIOS MANTAS1,3, (Member, IEEE),
AYMAN RADWAN 1, (Senior Member, IEEE), SHAHID MUMTAZ 1, (Member, IEEE),
JONATHAN RODRIGUEZ 1,2, (Senior Member, IEEE), AND IFIOK E. OTUNG2
1Instituto de Telecomunicações, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal
2Faculty of Computing, Engineering and Science, University of South Wales, Pontypridd CF37 1DL, U.K.
3Faculty of Engineering and Science, University of Greenwich, London SE10 9LS, U.K.
Corresponding author: Marcus de Ree (mderee@av.it.pt)
This research work leading to this publication received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation
programme under grant agreement H2020-MSCA-ITN-2016-SECRET-722424. The authors would also like to acknowledge the
collaboration with the EU-INDIA ICI+/2014/342-896 REACH project.
ABSTRACT The highly anticipated 5G network is projected to be introduced in 2020. 5G stakeholders are
unanimous that densification of mobile networks is the way forward. The densification will be realized
by means of small cell technology, and it is capable of providing coverage with a high data capacity.
The EU-funded H2020-MSCA project ‘‘SECRET’’ introduced covering the urban landscape with mobile
small cells, since these take advantages of the dynamic network topology and optimizes network services
in a cost-effective fashion. By taking advantage of the device-to-device communications technology, large
amounts of data can be transmitted over multiple hops and, therefore, offload the general network. However,
this introduction of mobile small cells presents various security and privacy challenges. Cryptographic
security solutions are capable of solving these as long as they are supported by a key management scheme.
It is assumed that the network infrastructure and mobile devices from network users are unable to act as
a centralized trust anchor since these are vulnerable targets to malicious attacks. Security must, therefore,
be guaranteed by means of a key management scheme that decentralizes trust. Therefore, this paper surveys
the state-of-the-art key management schemes proposed for similar network architectures (e.g., mobile ad hoc
networks and ad hoc device-to-device networks) that decentralize trust. Furthermore, these key management
schemes are evaluated for adaptability in a network of mobile small cells.
INDEX TERMS 5G, beyond 5G, decentralized systems, device-to-device communication, key management,
mobile small cells, security, small cells, wireless ad hoc networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been almost a decade since the 4G mobile net-
work was introduced. Since that time, many more users
and wireless devices have joined the network. The number
of wireless devices connected to the network is expected
to have grown by a factor somewhere between 100 and
10,000 by 2021 [1]. These devices range from PDAs to
smartphones, tablets and machines falling within the Inter-
net of Things (IoT) concept [2], [3]. Furthermore, demanded
mobile data is expected to have increased by a factor
of 1,000 per device by 2021 [1], [4]. This surge puts a lot of
pressure on the current 4G network. This causes a reduction
in data rates and it increases latency and signal interference.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Muhammad Imran.
To address these challenges, new technologies are emerg-
ing to create the next generation 5G network [5]–[9]. These
technologies will deliver higher network capacity, allow the
support of more users, lower the cost per bit, enhance energy
efficiency and provide the adaptability to introduce future
services and devices. It is envisioned that the 5G network will
be deployed by 2020 and beyond [1], [5], [6], [10] with data
rates reaching speeds up to 10 Gb/s and delays as low as 1 ms
end-to-end.
One of these emerging technologies is small cells.
The small cell technology is the most effective solution to
deliver ubiquitous 5G services in an energy efficient man-
ner to its users. In particular, mobile small cells are pro-
posed to cover the urban landscape. These can be set up
on-the-fly, based on demand, using mobile devices (i.e. user
equipment) or Remote Radio Units (RRUs) [11]. Mobile
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small cells are networks consisting of mobile devices which
are within relative close proximity. This allows device-to-
device (D2D) communications and enables high data rate
services such as video sharing, gaming and proximity-aware
social networking. Mobile small cells therefore negate the
necessity for network operators to install and maintain addi-
tional network infrastructure. End-users are provided with
this plethora of 5G broadband services while D2D commu-
nications improve throughput, energy efficiency, latency and
fairness [12]–[14].
The current network infrastructure guarantees secure data
transmissions between network subscribers with the distri-
bution of cryptographic keys present in SIM cards. These
keys are used to authenticate network subscribers, provides
access to network resources and establishes a secure chan-
nel between the mobile device and the network infrastruc-
ture. In order to set up secure D2D communications, mobile
devices require cryptographic keys which are shared between
each other. These keys require updating mechanisms to guar-
antee privacy over an extended period of time and revocation
mechanisms in the event that a mobile device is maliciously
compromised and no longer correctly identifies the owner of
the device. Providing secure communication in a network of
mobile small cells requires its own key management scheme.
Traditionally, a key management scheme relies on a central-
ized trusted third party (TTP). This TTP is considered to
be trustworthy and secure by every user inside the network.
It can therefore distribute cryptographic keys between any
set of network devices to set up a secure communications
channel.
A. CONTRIBUTION
This article surveys a wide spectrum of key manage-
ment schemes proposed for securing mobile ad hoc net-
works (MANETs) as well as ad hoc D2D networks. A net-
work of mobile small cells could be interpreted as a hybrid
between these two types of networks, sharing many common
network characteristics such as network nodes communicat-
ing in a multi-hop wireless fashion; network nodes function
as both hosts and routers; these networks have a dynamic
network topology; and these networks can be homogeneous
or heterogeneous.
Key management schemes proposed for MANETs are
self-organized during network deployment due to its inability
to rely on an available and online centralized TTP. Numer-
ous quality surveys exist which explore proposed key man-
agement solutions for MANETs [15]–[20]. These surveys
describe individual key management schemes and evalu-
ates them for general infrastructureless MANETs. However,
mobile small cells are network infrastructure-assisted which
provide opportunities when it comes to aspects such as key
management and efficient routing.
Key management schemes proposed for ad hoc
D2D networks consider the assistance of available network
infrastructure, but do not take densification of the network
into account. There are few quality surveys related to secu-
rity for D2D communications. To emphasize, the quality
surveys [21], [22] cover many aspects of D2D communica-
tions technology, however security was still mentioned as
an open research problem. Recently, two surveys [23], [24]
about security for D2D communications were published.
These surveys cover key management proposals of which
many either assume that the network infrastructure is secure
against compromise or they do not consider multi-hop com-
munication.
On the other hand, the key management schemes in our
survey are selected based on their ability to self-organize
the key management to secure multi-hop D2D communica-
tions without having to rely on a fixed intrastructure and
an online centralized TTP. Furthermore, a key management
classification is provided that categorizes various approaches
of solving the key management. These approaches are treated
as a collective of key management schemes and include work
extending upon the original key management scheme. This
provides a detailed and wide scope of the potential of a key
management approach such that they can be properly evalu-
ated for their adoptability to secure a network of mobile small
cells. It has been the aim to include proposed mechanisms
such as the network initialization, key generation, key dis-
tribution, key authentication, key update and key revocation.
Details regarding the involved mathematics, algorithms or
protocols are not discussed since these would not affect the
outcome of the evaluation of the key management approach
for adoptability in a network of mobile small cells covering
the urban landscape.
B. STRUCTURE OF THE SURVEY
Section II provides a description of the envisioned net-
work architecture in which mobile small cells enable the
mobile devices equipped with D2D communications tech-
nology to communicate in a multi-hop wireless fashion.
Each network characteristic is individually evaluated from
a security and privacy standpoint and its challenges are
described. Section III gives an overview of the evaluated
self-organized key management approaches and provides a
compilation of requirements which a self-organized keyman-
agement scheme must satisfy in order to be suitable for
adoption in a network of mobile small cells. The follow-
ing sections describe and evaluate self-organizing key man-
agement schemes. Key management schemes in section IV
rely on certificate-based public key cryptography (PKC),
in section V they rely on identity-based PKC, in section VI
they rely on certificateless PKC and in section VII they
rely on symmetric key cryptography (SKC). Section VIII
compares the evaluated key management approaches and
highlights the main considerations affecting its adoptabil-
ity. Section IX provides researchers with insight about
designing a self-organized key management scheme for net-
works utilizing the network coding [25] paradigm. Finally,
section X presents some uncovered open research problems
and section XI draws conclusions and outlines future research
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FIGURE 1. The scenario architecture as introduced by project ‘‘SECRET’’ [26].
directions to design novel key management schemes suitable
for providing security and privacy in a network of mobile
small cells.
II. MOBILE SMALL CELLS
A. A NETWORK OF MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The densification of the urban landscape by means of mobile
small cells and network offloading by means of enabling
D2D communications lead to a network which is capable of
increasing data rates and energy efficiency while reducing
latency and interference. However, many of these advantages
can be credited to the introduction of ordinary small cells.
Since the strength of a radio signal diminishes with the square
of the distance, replacing large transmissions to and from the
base station (BS) by multiple shorter transmissions provides
significant energy savings. Similarly, the shorter and less
powerful signals will reduce interference which allows for
a higher throughput and thus increased data rates. Lower
latency is realized by providing a more direct route between a
source node (SN) and a destination node (DN). Nevertheless,
mobile small cells provide additional advantages. They can
be setup on-the-fly, based on demand, at any place, at any
time, using existing mobile devices or Remote Radio Units
(RRUs) [11]. This wireless ad hoc network can therefore
function at a low cost since network operators are not required
to install and maintain additional network infrastructure. Fur-
thermore, mobile small cells support time and space varying
traffic [27], [28].
The EU-funded H2020-MSCA project ‘‘SECRET’’ [29]
introduces a scenario architecture for the next generation
mobile network which provides opportunities for both net-
work operators and network users. This scenario architecture
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The cellular network, consisting of macro cells is par-
titioned into a network (or cloud) of mobile small cells.
Each of these is controlled and maintained by a hotspot (i.e.
cluster-head). This is a mobile node within the cluster that
is selected to become the local radio manager to control and
maintain the cluster. In addition, each hotspot is controlled by
a centralized software-defined controller. Through coopera-
tion these hotspots form a wireless network that has several
gateways/entry points to the mobile network using intelligent
high-speed connections. Data traffic between mobile nodes is
established through D2D communication.
Suppose that a mobile node wishes to share data with two
other mobile nodes. The mobile node in possession of this
data, the source node (SN), sends the data to the mobile nodes
requesting the data, the destination nodes (DNs). Note that
these mobile nodes are not required to be in the same mobile
small cell as illustrated in Fig. 1. Using D2D communications
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and multiple hops, the data is being routed through the net-
work of mobile small cells from the SN to the DNs.
B. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES
The scenario architecture brings multiple networking tech-
nologies together. Each of these comes with security and
privacy challenges. The privacy threats can be divided into
two categories, identity privacy and data privacy. Identity
privacy threats cover attacks in which the attacker uncovers
identifying information about the sender or receiver, whereas
data privacy threats cover attacks in which the attacker uncov-
ers information about the transmitted data. The following
sections identify the security and privacy challenges for each
networking technology present in the scenario architecture.
1) MULTI-HOP WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
Allowing data to traverse multiple hops to reach its destina-
tion brings a spectrum of privacy threats. To establish secure
communication between two mobile nodes, both nodes are
required to prove their identity to each other while remaining
anonymous to intermediate nodes. This challenge can be
solved with anonymous mutual authentication. With anony-
mous mutual authentication, both mobile nodes participate in
a so-called zero-knowledge proof of identity protocol. This
protocol involves the exchange of challenges in which both
nodes eventually prove their knowledge of a pre-established
secret. This secret (or key) would only be known by these two
nodes, therefore effectively identifying each other. Without
initial identification, communication is susceptible to identity
impersonation attacks. Furthermore, an intermediate node
could modify or eavesdrop on data in transmission. These
attacks are well studied and various cryptographic techniques
are developed to counter these attacks. Data modification
attacks can be detected using signature schemes and integrity
schemes whereas eavesdropping can be prevented using data
encryption schemes. However, each countermeasure requires
the communicating nodes to be in possession of a pre-shared
secret key [30], [31].
Multi-hop wireless communication is also affected by
free-riding. Free-riding means that a mobile node acts self-
ishly, unwilling to route data to others while still requesting
demanded data, for the purpose of increasing battery life.
This reduces fairness and transmission availability within
the network. Stimulating cooperation mechanisms are nec-
essary to prevent free-riding and several solutions have been
proposed [32]–[34].
2) D2D COMMUNICATIONS
The introduction of D2D communications technology poses
location-based privacy challenges, since these data transmis-
sions require relative close proximity between mobile nodes.
This allows colluding users to perform a boundary attack to
locate nearby mobile nodes. Zickuhr [35] conducted a survey
and found that 46% of teen users and 35% of adults turn
off location tracking features due to privacy concerns. These
privacy concerns need to be addressed so that users will allow
their devices to be discoverable and participate in routing data
through D2D communications. Fortunately, location privacy
can be guaranteed using the identity preserving techniques of
anonymous mutual authentication [31]. As discussed previ-
ously, anonymous mutual authentication relies on pre-shared
secret keys.
3) MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The introduction of mobile small cells defines the parties
involved in the network. These involved parties are themobile
devices and the network infrastructure. Neither of these par-
ties are considered capable of resisting compromise by a
malicious attacker and therefore cannot act as the online
centralized TTP. The online centralized TTP would be the
single-point-of-attack within the network such that denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks disable key management services.
Therefore, the core issue of mobile small cells lies in the
lack of a secure and trusted entity to establish security during
network deployment. This lack of a trusted entity poses issues
when it comes to the key management.
Key management schemes dictate how cryptographic keys
are generated, distributed to network nodes, authenticated,
updated, revoked and so on. These keys are then used to
perform cryptographic schemes, like the ones discussed pre-
viously. Key management is therefore the building block
upon which all security is based.
In the literature there has been key management schemes
proposed for similar network architectures such as MANETs
and ad hoc D2D networks, however these schemes are either
incomplete (e.g., lacking key update or key revocation proce-
dures), they rely on a secure routing protocol or they require
some other form of a secure channel for (partial) key distribu-
tion which is difficult to realize in our scenario architecture.
This exploration of security and privacy challenges demon-
strates that cryptographic techniques and anonymous mutual
authentication are able to provide secrecy and anonymity
assuming that an underlying key management scheme can
effectively support these. Therefore, it is of the utmost impor-
tance to design novel key management schemes which fit our
scenario architecture. These schemes should provide robust
and low complexity key management including secret key
sharing among mobile nodes, key revocation, key update and
mobile node authentication.
III. SELF-ORGANIZED KEY MANAGEMENT
A. OVERVIEW OF SELF-ORGANIZED KEY MANAGEMENT
APPROACHES
Key management schemes can be classified in a variety
of ways. In this article, we have classified each key man-
agement scheme by the form of cryptography which is
used and therefore defines the method of key establishment
and key authentication, the initial phases of key manage-
ment. The authors consider key management schemes to be
self-organizing when mobile devices do not have to rely
on an online centralized TTP to provide key management
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TABLE 1. Summarizing table of security and privacy challenges in the proposed scenario architecture.
FIGURE 2. Classification of self-organized key management approaches.
services during network deployment. This classification of
the proposed self-organized key management schemes dis-
cussed in this article are illustrated in Fig. 2.
In certificate-based public key cryptography
(CB-PKC) [36], [37] every network node self-generates its
own mathematically linked public and private key pair. Next,
each node would contact the centralized TTP – also known as
the Certification Authority (CA) – which verifies the identity
of the network node and provides this node with a signed
certificate containing the public key and the identity of its
owner (among other information). This signed certificate
could then be distributed throughout the network to nodes
requesting to securely communicate with the owner of the
certificate. The signature on the certificate can be verified
such that the requesting node is confident that the public key
on the certificate is authentic. Since a network of mobile
small cells is unable to support an online centralized TTP,
this article presents five approaches based on CB-PKCwhich
propose alternative methods of providing a means to verify
the authenticity of public keys.
In identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC)
[38]–[40] the identity of a network node (e.g., network
address, phone number) is used as a public key. This
identity is public knowledge and does not require cer-
tificates to distribute this keying information through the
network. However, corresponding private keys cannot be
simply generated from a public key. Instead, private keys
are provided by the centralized TTP – also known as
the Private Key Generator (PKG) – after it verified the
identity of the network node. Due to the inability to sup-
port an online centralized TTP in a network of mobile
small cells, this article presents three approaches based
on ID-PKC which proposes alternative methods to pro-
viding network nodes with authentic identity-based private
keys.
In certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC)
[41], [42] every network node combines two key pairs to
establish secure communication. A network node creates a
mathematically linked key pair, similar to the key pair used
in CB-PKC, while also using its identity as a public key
and its corresponding private key obtained from the cen-
tralized TTP – also known as the Key Generation Center
(KGC) – after it verified the identity of the network node.
Both of these key pairs would be used for securing com-
munication. A network node wishing to communicate with
the key pair owner would request the (certificateless) public
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key and use this along with the owner’s identity to secure
communication. The (certificateless) public key does not
require to be authenticated, since an adversary is unable to
benefit from replacing the public key for a false one. This is
due to the identity-based private key which is still unknown
to the adversary. The provided public key and identity can
therefore be used to secure communication, since only the
owner of both possesses the corresponding private keys.
Again, due to the inability to support an online centralized
TTP in a network of mobile small cells, this article presents
two approaches based on CL-PKC which proposes alter-
native methods to providing network nodes with authentic
identity-based private keys.
Symmetric key cryptography encompasses three meth-
ods of establishing keys which can be verified for
authenticity [36], [37]. These three methods are named key
pre-distribution, key distribution and key agreement. For
the key pre-distribution and key distribution method, a
TTP – also known as the Key Distribution Center (KDC) –
provides network nodes with keys. With key pre-distribution,
every node receives a set of keys prior to network deployment
such that each key is shared with one other node inside the
network. The use of a particular key therefore informs both
parties who they are communicating with, thus authentica-
tion is provided along with the keys from the KDC. Key
distribution works similarly, however the keys are distributed
on-demand and during network deployment. Key agreement
is the only scheme which does not rely on a TTP. Network
nodes wishing to set up a secure channel follow a protocol
in which each node contributes some secret information to
create a shared key. However, authentication is necessary to
prevent a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, meaning that
each network node must have a means to identify the other
prior to establishing a shared key. This is only possible if each
network node is in possession of some secret information that
only they know, therefore relying on a pre-distributed secret
or a public key management scheme. This article discusses
research efforts following the symmetric key management
approach, however no proposal was eventually found to
be able to securely self-organize the key management in a
dynamic network.
B. REQUIREMENTS OF SELF-ORGANIZED KEY
MANAGEMENT FOR A NETWORK OF MOBILE SMALL
CELLS
Many cryptographic security solutions are available to solve
the security and privacy challenges in a network which
combines multi-hop, wireless and D2D communications
with mobile small cells. However, the difficulty of secur-
ing this network architecture comes from its reliance on
a decentralized and efficient key management scheme to
support these cryptographic security solutions. This sub-
section describes the seven requirements that a key man-
agement scheme must satisfy in order to be suitable as a
valid candidate for adoption in a network of mobile small
cells.
1) SECURITY
The most important requirement and the main principle on
which cryptography is based on, providing security. The key
management scheme is expected to provide key management
services such that every network node is capable of estab-
lishing or obtaining keying material at any time necessary
(availability); that the key management service allows nodes
to obtain keying material from other network nodes while
having the ability to authenticate its validity (authentication);
and that the keying material supports the use of data encryp-
tion schemes to ensure that only the communicating parties
are able to understand the transmitted data (data confiden-
tiality), integrity schemes to ensure transmitted data is secure
against modification (data integrity), and signature schemes
to prevent a party from denying that it transmitted the data
(non-repudiation).
2) CONNECTIVITY
In this context, nodes are connected when they have a secure
means of obtaining necessary keying material in a verifi-
able manner. Therefore, a network has a high connectivity
rate when any arbitrary set of network nodes have a high
probability of obtaining each other’s keying material in a
verifiable manner. Additionally, connectivity is an important
requirement for network operators to consider if they are
interested in utilizing network coding while preventing data
pollution attacks.
3) OVERHEAD
The overhead requirement encompasses the communication
overhead, the computational overhead and the memory stor-
age overhead. An efficient key management scheme mini-
mizes the overhead without compromising any of the other
requirements. The computational capabilities and the mem-
ory storage volume of mobile devices continues to improve
and is expected to keep improving over time. Due to this
ongoing development, these constraints are not considered as
highly impactful. Therefore, key management schemes are
mainly evaluated based on their communication overhead.
4) SCALABILITY
Due to the network architecture being designed to serve an
urban landscape, it is considered that mobile small cells have
the capacity to contain large numbers of mobile devices.
However, the size of a mobile small cell is yet undefined
and will therefore not be bounded in any of the considered
key management schemes. Also, over time mobility causes
the number of users inside a mobile small cell to fluctuate.
The key management scheme must therefore be both scalable
in terms of efficiently supporting a large fixed network size
while also supporting dynamic network size changes.
5) SUSTAINABILITY
The 5G and beyond 5G mobile network is considered to have
a long lifetime. Designed key management schemes must be
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able to provide key management services from a security,
connectivity and overhead perspective. This means that the
key management scheme must resists any malicious attack
for which the attacker has an extended time to make its attack
successful, it is able to maintain a high level of connectivity
and the overhead does not grow based on events happening
over time. If a key management scheme is able to perform
these tasks for the entire lifetime of the network, then the
scheme is considered sustainable.
6) FAIRNESS
Fairness implies that the overhead costs to establish and
maintain proper key management are fairly distributed over
all the network nodes throughout the entire lifetime of the
network. When the fairness requirement is not met, device
owners are more likely to behave selfishly (i.e. free-riding
behavior) and make their device unavailable to route data.
This reduction in availability indirectly reduces connectivity
and increases the overhead cost per node.
7) SECURE ROUTING INDEPENDENCE
This requirement relates to the secure routing interdepen-
dency problem [43], [44]. Secure routing protocols, such
as [45]–[50] were developed for wireless ad hoc networks
and they rely on a pre-established and underlying key man-
agement scheme to securely route data through the network.
Therefore, when a key management scheme wishes to utilize
a secure routing protocol to securely distribute keys, we reach
an impasse. Thus, it is important that a key management
scheme does not rely on secure routing [51], [52].
C. NOTATION
This article has limited the amount of variables, parameters
and symbols in the text by not including details of the key
management approaches such as algorithms, equations and
protocols. These details are omitted since their impact on the
evaluation for adoption is negligible. The variables, parame-
ters and symbols which are used throughout this article are
provided in Table 2.
IV. CERTIFICATE-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
In certificate-based public key cryptography (CB-PKC),
every node inside a network can generate their own public
and private key. These public and private keys are mathe-
matically linked which allows them to be used for various
cryptographic protocols, such as the creation of unforgeable
signatures, the verification of these signature, the encryption
of data or the decryption of encrypted data. However, public
keys being distributed between nodes inside such a network
must be linked to its owner and be verifiable. Typically,
a node would contact a TTP – also known as a Certification
Authority (CA) –which verifies the identity of the node. After
verification, the CA creates a certificate for this node, con-
taining the nodes’ identity, its public key and an unforgeable
signature. The node is now able to distribute this certificate to
other nodes inside the network, which are able to verify the
TABLE 2. Variables, parameters, and symbols.
authenticity of the certificate from the signature provided by
the CA. This CA is an online central control point, which does
not fit in a network of mobile small cells. The authentication
of public keys therefore requires an alternate mechanism.
This chapter discusses five key management approaches
relying onCB-PKC. The certificate chaining-based approach,
the mobility-based approach, the self-certification-based
approach, the partially distributed CA-based approach and
the fully distributed CA-based approach.
A. CERTIFICATE CHAINING-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The certificate chaining-based approach was introduced
by Hubaux et al. in [53], and later fully described by
Capkun et al. in [54].
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
This approach relies on network nodes establishing a web-
of-trust, similar to the e-mail security system Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) [55], which allows for the authentication of
every node’s public key. The basic idea is that nodes which
have a pre-existing trust relationship uses this trust to sign
each other’s certificates, containing the node’s identity and its
public key. Suppose that nodes A and B trust one another and
decide to issue each other’s certificates. Both nodes create
a certificate for each other and exchanges these while also
keeping a copy of the certificate for their personal certificate
repository. Suppose that nodes B and C also have a trust
relationship and decide to issue certificates for each other.
When node A and C wish to communicate, without having
a pre-existing trust relationship, they merge their personal
certificate repositories in order to look for a chain of trust
connecting both nodes. Since node A trusts node B and node
B issued a certificate for node C , node A has reason to
believe that this certificate contains nodeC’s authentic public
key. However, when no chain of trust exists between both
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FIGURE 3. Illustration of three main phases in the certificate chaining-based approach. (a) Certificate issuing phase. (b) Certificate exchange phase.
(c) Certificate chain discovery phase.
nodes after merging their personal certificate repositories,
they have no reason to trust the authenticity of exchanged
certificates.
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of five main phases. The network ini-
tialization phase, the certificate issuing phase, the certifi-
cate exchange phase, the certificate repository update phase,
and the certificate chain discovery phase. In the first phase,
the network initialization phase, every node wishing to be
a part of the network creates their own public-private key
pair. To establish some initial trust and connectivity in the
network, [56] proposed to have a trusted secret dealer dis-
tribute identities and public keys of k arbitrary nodes to
each network node. The following four phases are performed
throughout the entire lifetime of the network.
In the second phase, the certificate issuing phase, nodes
issue certificates to neighboring nodes.When nodeA believes
that the presented public key belongs to node B, it will issue
a certificate. This certificate includes the identity of node B,
its public key, the time of certificate issuing and the time
of certificate expiration along with the signature of node
A. Node A transmits this certificate to node B while also
keeping a copy. These certificates are stored in the node’s
local certificate repository. Trust relationships between nodes
can be displayed in a trust graph as shown in Fig. 3(a). This
is a directed graph in which the vertices represent the public
keys of nodes and the directed edges represent the issued
certificates verifiable by the node’s public key. There is a
directed edge from vertex A to vertex B when node A issued
a certificate for node B.
In the third phase, the certificate exchange phase, neigh-
boring nodes exchange certificates. Obtained certificates are
stored into the node’s local certificate repository. This cer-
tificate exchange mechanism creates awareness of trust rela-
tionships in the neighborhood and is illustrated in Fig. 3(b).
Node mobility forces this certificate exchange mecha-
nism to be performed periodically. Instead of exchanging
certificates, [57], [58] proposed to exchange simple trust rela-
tionship information to reduce the storage requirement. Cer-
tificates would only be exchanged on-demand to establish a
certificate chain. The certificate exchange phase could even
be entirely removed [59]–[67] and instead have on-demand
routing protocols, such as ASNS [61]–[63], DSR [68] or
AODV [69], find certificate chains. However, these schemes
increase delay and communication overhead.
In the fourth phase, the certificate repository update phase,
nodes update their local certificate repositories. Due to the
limited amount of storage, the most recent certificates are
kept in storage and nodes update their respective trust graphs
accordingly.
In the fifth phase, the certificate chain discovery phase,
nodes wishing to securely communicate attempt to discover
a certificate chain. Suppose that node A wishes to commu-
nicate with node B, then node A first examines its local
certificate repository for a certificate chain connecting both
nodes. If node A is unable to find a certificate chain, then
node A contacts node B and requests its local certificate
repository. Node A merges both certificate repositories in
order to find a certificate chain. This process is synony-
mous to merging both nodes’ trust graphs to find a path
connecting both nodes and is illustrated in Fig. 3(c). Once
node A finds a certificate chain, it verifies the validity of
each certificate to eventually verify the validity of the pub-
lic key of node B. Hubaux et al. [53] proposed two algo-
rithms to find a certificate chain. To simplify the certificate
chain discovery process, [70]–[72] proposed the use of a
cluster-based hierarchy while [73]–[75] proposed the use of
a (binary) tree-based hierarchy. In case multiple certificate
chains are discovered, [64], [66], [70], [71], [76]–[79] pro-
posed various methods of adding a continuous trust metric to
links in order to select the most trustworthy certificate chain.
According to [80], some threshold amount of chains resulting
in the same public key should exist before it can be considered
trustworthy.
Capkun et al. [54] described three scenarios in which cer-
tificates are revoked. In the first scenario, a certificate reaches
its expiration time. In this case, nodes move this certificate
from its local certificate repository to a non-updating certifi-
cate repository. To prevent certificates from expiring, nodes
within communication range of their certificate issuer can
request a new certificate. In the second scenario, nodes are
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allowed to revoke any certificate they previously issued when
they believe that the binding between the node’s identity
and its public key is no longer valid. In the third scenario,
a node believes that his private key has been compromised.
This node contacts nodes which issued a certificate to it and
requests them to revoke these certificates. The created revo-
cation statements will spread through the network during the
certificate exchange phases. To more rapidly spread certifi-
cate revocation information, [59], [60] proposed to broadcast
these statements immediately to all two-hop neighbors.
To increase the security of this system, [67], [77], [79],
[81], [82] proposed to combine certificate chaining with a
partially distributed certificate authority (PD-CA) which acts
as a trust anchor. More details about the PD-CA-based key
management approach can be found in section IV-D.
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is not met due to the reliance on the
assumption that trust is transitive while this is not necessarily
the case [83]. Node A may trust node B and node B may
trust node C , but node A may not necessarily trust node C .
Furthermore, trust is context-dependent [84]. Node A may
trust node B as a sports coach, but not as a security expert.
A malicious user may abuse his trust relationships to disrupt
communication. Furthermore, the certificate issuing process
is assumed to be performed physically to prevent malicious
MITM attacks. Seeking physical contact to issue certificates
is unrealistic in our scenario architecture and requires an
alternative approach.
The connectivity requirement is not met either. To establish
secure communication between an arbitrary set of nodes,
there must be a high probability that a certificate chain
exists. This key management approach was proposed for
MANETs for use cases such as military and rescue oper-
ations. In both cases, network nodes consist of users with
many pre-established trust relationships. This creates clus-
ters of trust relationship while inter-cluster relationships are
established by cluster-heads cooperating to achieve their
common goal. This translates to a network with a high
certificate-density and therefore a high probability of estab-
lishing a certificate chain between an arbitrary set of nodes.
The network ofmobile small cells consists of users with fewer
pre-established trust relationships. The certificate-density is
therefore lower, reducing the chances of nodes establishing
a certificate chain. Distributing keying information from a
trusted dealer during the network initialization phase could
improve connectivity [56], however this will have a reduced
effect over time.
The secure routing independence requirement is not met
either. The exchange of certificate repositories seems to rely
on secure routing to counter MITM attacks.
No issues have been identified related to the overhead,
scalability, sustainability and fairness requirement. Based
on these evaluations, the authors believe that the certificate
chaining-based key management approach will not be able
to provide efficient and effective key management to support
cryptographic protocols and secure a network of mobile small
cells.
B. MOBILITY-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The mobility-based key management approach was intro-
duced by Capkun et al. in [85], [86].
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
This approach uses network mobility to its advantage.
To establish secure communication, this approach proposes
that nodes initially meet physically in order for both to verify
each other’s identity. Both nodes would exchange keying
information (i.e. issued certificates) with their mobile devices
using a short range communications system (e.g., infrared
or wire). It is assumed that the exchange over this secure
side channel is activated by both nodes simultaneously and
consciously. By having short range entity authentication,
some of the classical ’remote’ entity authentication problems
like identity impersonation and Sybil attacks [87] are pre-
vented. Friends, family members and colleagues (users with
a bi-directional trust relationship) inside this network would
similarly exchange keying information offline or over the
secure side-channel. Simulations in [85] show that a reason-
ably long time is required before sufficient connections are
made to establish reliable communication inside this network.
To reduce this problem, they proposed that nodes sharing a
common friend can use that relationship to obtain trustwor-
thy keying information. This information can be transmitted
remotely since both nodes previously established a secure
channel with their friend. These simulations also show that
the use of the common friend mechanisms, to further dis-
tribute keying information, can reduce the convergence time
of reliable network communication by a factor of 10.
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the certificate issuing phase, and the
certificate exchange phase. In the first phase, the network
initialization phase, every node wishing to be a part of the
network creates their own private key and the corresponding
public key. The following two phases are performed through-
out the entire lifetime of the network.
In the second phase, the certificate issuing phase, network
nodes exchange their public keys to each other in order to
issue and exchange certificates in the next phase. Due to
network mobility, nodes will physically meet every so often.
Meeting nodes which do not have any prior trust relationship
provide identifying information in order to prove their iden-
tity to the other. If both nodes are convinced that the other
node’s public key belongs to the provided identity, they use
the short range and secure side channel (i.e. over infrared
or wire) to exchange keying information on their mobile
devices. This side channel ensures data integrity by elimi-
nating any active adversary. A series of exchanges provide
both nodes with each other’s public key and a signature to
prove that the other node has the private key corresponding to
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FIGURE 4. Mechanisms to establish security associations between
network nodes in the mobility-based approach.
the public key. This provides both nodes with a secure com-
munications channel, displayed as mechanism (a) in Fig. 4.
Details of the keying information exchange protocol can be
found in [86]. Nodes which have an existing bi-directional
trust relationship are called friends and they can similarly use
the secure side channel to exchange their public keys.
In the third phase, the certificate exchange phase, network
nodes distribute certificates. In mechanism (b) of Fig. 4, two
nodes A and B share a common friend F . Since friend F
previously exchanged its public key with both node A and
node B, it can issue fresh certificates on request and transmit
these to both nodes. Both node A and B are able to verify the
certificate provided by F , since they both trust F and have the
their friendF’s public key.Mechanisms (c1) and (c2) in Fig. 4
are combinations of mechanism (a) and (b). In mechanism
(c1), nodeA has a friendF , who previously exchanged keying
information with node B. On request from node A, friend F
could issue a fresh certificate of node B’s public key and
transmit this to node A. Since node A exchanged public
keys with friend F , and also trusts friend F , it can verify
the authenticity of node B’s certificate. However, node B
exchanged public keys with node F after meeting physically
which led node B to believe that the public key of node F
is authentic. Node B has no further trust relationship with
node F , and therefore will not consider certificates coming
from and signed by nodeF to be trustworthy.Mechanism (c1)
therefore only provides a uni-directional security association.
Mechanism (c2) is a further expansion of mechanism (c1)
in which, using the same logic as before, can provide a
bi-directional security association between nodes A and B.
According to simulations, the common friend mechanisms
further distribute keying information almost by a factor of 10.
To provide data integrity, [88] proposed the use of hash func-
tions in the creation of security associations such that chains
of trust can be established which are longer than just 2 links.
Capkun et al. [85], [86] also provide a symmetric keyman-
agement variety. Instead of having a common friend which
distributes signed certificates, the friendwould act as a trusted
entity to provide both of its friend nodes with a shared sym-
metric key. This shared symmetric key could be generated
by the common friend and distributed to both nodes (like in
the Kerberos protocol [89]) or one of the two nodes would
generate a symmetric key and the common friend would
relay it to the other node (like in the Wide-Mouthed-Frog
protocol [90]).
No details are provided about certificate revocation.
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is conditionally met. Similar to the
certificate chaining-based key management approach, three
mechanisms are proposed which rely on transitive trust which
is not necessarily secure [83], [84]. This scheme is still more
secure compared to the certificate chaining-based approach
since the number of trusted entities involved in exchanging
keying information is limited to one. Nevertheless, explicit
security can only be guaranteed by omitting mechanisms
(b), (c1), and (c2) illustrated in Fig. 4. The disadvantage is
that reliance on only mechanism (a) further disconnects the
network. Furthermore, the physical contact required to set up
security associations is unrealistic in our scenario architecture
and requires an alternative approach.
The connectivity requirement is not met either. To establish
secure communication between an arbitrary set of nodes,
there must be a high probability that these nodes can estab-
lish security association with each other. However, con-
nectivity in this approach relies on the mobility intensity
and the validity period of issued certificates. As network
nodes become increasingly mobile, they meet nodes more
often and can establish more security associations. A longer
validity period also increases the amount of valid security
associations, unfortunately this also comes at the cost of
an increased memory overhead. Furthermore, this approach
is limited when it comes to connectivity in comparison to
the certificate chaining-based approach which can establish
security associations through friends-of-friends and beyond.
A small network may be able to provide a sufficient level of
connectivity, but this is not expected for a network covering
the urban landscape.
No issues have been identified related to the overhead, scal-
ability, sustainability, fairness and secure routing indepen-
dence requirement. Based on these evaluations, the authors
believe that the mobility-based key management approach
will not be able to provide efficient and effective key manage-
ment to support cryptographic protocols to secure a network
of mobile small cells.
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FIGURE 5. Illustration of the neighborhood certificate distribution mechanism in the self-certification-based approach. (a) node N requests certificate
distribution (b) neighboring nodes A,B,C, and D reply (c) node N finalizes the distribution.
C. SELF-CERTIFICATION-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The self-certification-based key management approach was
introduced by Li et al. [91].
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this approach network nodes issue their own certificates.
Upon nodes joining the network or moving into a new neigh-
borhood, nodes broadcast a request for certificate distribution
(while also sending their own certificate) to everyone within
their transmission range, also called their 1-hop neighbor-
hood. Every 1-hop neighbor responds by broadcasting the
certificates of all of its 1-hop neighbors. This certificate
distribution mechanism provides the newly moved-in node
with certificates from all nodes within its 2-hop neighbor-
hood. At the same time, neighborhood monitoring prevents
nodes from sending false certificates. Suppose that a node
has been compromised and sends a false certificate during
the certificate distribution process, neighboring nodes can
detect this false transmission. These neighboring nodes pos-
sess the certificates of their 2-hop neighbors and can there-
fore cross-check if a compromised neighbor sends any false
certificates. A node wishing to communicate with another
node within its 2-hop neighborhood can use the certificate
provided during the certificate distribution. If the two nodes
are more than two hops away from each other and do not
share each other’s certificate, they can request a multi-hop
certificate distribution. This multi-hop certificate distribution
basically floods the network in search for the node that the
requester wishes to communicate with and through chains of
certificates, which are verified at every step against malicious
users, a route can be established to share verified certificates
and therefore the public keys of each other.
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the neighborhood certificate distribu-
tion phase, and the multi-hop certificate distribution phase.
In the first phase, the network initialization phase, every node
wishing to be a part of the network creates their public-private
key pair followed by a self-issuing of its certificate. This is the
creation of the certificate by the node itself in which it signs
it own certificate. The signature is created from the node’s
private key and the hashed information on the certificate such
that any other node can verify that the certificate is created
with a valid public-private key pair. The following two phases
are performed throughout the entire lifetime of the network.
In the second phase, the neighborhood certificate distribu-
tion phase, nodes broadcast certification information upon
neighborhood changes. Every node in the network period-
ically broadcasts hello-messages to inform other nodes of
their 1-hop neighbors. When a node N joins a new neighbor-
hood, a 3-step neighborhood certificate distribution process
is triggered. This process is illustrated in Fig. 5. In the first
step, the node N broadcasts a request for certificates of its
neighbors, while distributing its own certificate. In the sec-
ond step, neighboring nodes receiving the request verify the
received certificate for authenticity. Upon correct verifica-
tion, the node replies by broadcasting a message containing
its own certificate and the certificates of its 1-hop neigh-
bors. This informs the 2-hop neighbors of node N joining
the neighborhood while also informing the node N about
its 2-hop neighbors. Finally, node N broadcasts a message
containing its certificate and the certificates of all its 1-hop
neighbors. This is necessary since node N may have created
a 2-hop connection between nodes which previously did not
exist. Nodes perform neighborhood monitoring during this
phase. Since every node is aware of their 2-hop neighbors,
they are able to cross-check if every neighbor broadcasts the
correct certificates of its 1-hop neighbors.
The third phase, the multi-hop certificate distribution
phase, is triggered when a node A wishes to establish a
connection with a node B and are separated by more than
two hops. Node A broadcasts a request message containing
its own certificate and the identity of node B. The 1-hop
neighbors verify node A’s signature after which they append
the request message with their own certificate and a signa-
ture of this extended request message. Then, these 1-hop
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neighbors broadcast the extended request message further
along the network. The 2-hop neighbors and subsequent
neighbors verify the signature from the previous two nodes
and continue this process. Verification is necessary to detect
any malicious behavior. Nodes drop any returning requests
such that the request message travels from node A to its
1-hop neighbors, 2-hop neighbors, and so on, until it reaches
node B. This mechanism prevents a Sybil attack [87].
If a node believes that its public-private key pair is compro-
mised, it can select a new private key with its corresponding
public key and create a self-issued certificate. Also, when a
node’s certificate expires it can self-issue a new certificate.
The node then broadcasts a certificate revocation message
consisting of its old certificate, its new certificate, and a
signature. The 1-hop neighbors will verify this message and
broadcast it to inform the 2-hop neighbors. There is no
mention of a particular mechanism which reports malicious
activities discovered from neighborhood monitoring.
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is not met. This is due to the key
management approach being outright vulnerable to an imper-
sonation attack caused by self-certification. Li et al. [91]
points out that nodes inside the network which have pre-
viously exchanged the certificate of the real node have its
certificate stored in their certificate table and could therefore
detect malicious behavior over time. However, the imperson-
ator could cause major damages by the time this is detected
and reported. This impersonation attack is claimed to be pre-
ventable by creating a strong one-to-one binding between the
certificate and the public key of the user [92]. The viability
of this solution requires further investigation.
The overhead requirement is not met either. Due to this
approach relying on nodes being constantly aware of their
2-hop neighborhood to provide proper neighborhood moni-
toring and the network of mobile small cells being proposed
for an urban environment with a constantly changing network
topology, nodes are required to broadcast hello-messages
with rather short intervals. This causes a large communication
overhead.
The scalability requirement is not met. An increase in
network density would indicate more topological changes
which further increases the communication overhead. Also,
an increase in network range (i.e. a larger portion of nodes
are more than 2 hops away from each other) would increased
the use of the multi-hop certificate distribution which relies
on flooding the network with broadcast messages in order to
find the requested certificate and public key. This scheme is
therefore not scalable from an overhead perspective.
No issues have been identified related to the connectiv-
ity, sustainability, fairness and secure routing independence
requirement. Based on these evaluations, the authors believe
that the self-certification-based key management approach
will not be able to provide efficient and effective key manage-
ment to support cryptographic protocols to secure a network
of mobile small cells.
D. PARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED CA-BASED KEY
MANAGEMENT
The partially distributed CA-based approach (PD-CA) was
introduced by Zhou et al. in [93]. This approach distributes
the trust from an ordinary centralized CA to a proper sub-
set of network nodes and is therefore called partially dis-
tributed. Zhou et al. implemented their online distributed
CA [94], [95] although not in an ad hoc environment.
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The general idea of the PD-CA-based key management
approach is distributing the trust from a single central-
ized trusted authority to a proper subset of nodes inside
the network. This subset of nodes, called servers, perform
the certifying tasks collectively. Upon network initializa-
tion, a master public-private key pair is created. The master
public key is made public while the master private key is
divided into n shares and distributed to the n servers. These
shares are created from a t-out-of-n threshold cryptography
scheme [96], [97]. In this key management scheme, a thresh-
old of at least t trustworthy servers is required to create a
valid signature on a certificate. An adversary needs to com-
promise at least t servers to be able to reconstruct the master
private key such that it can create false signatures. To prevent
this from happening, [93] proposed to combine their scheme
with proactive threshold cryptography [98]–[102] and verifi-
able threshold cryptography [103], [104]. Proactive threshold
cryptography includes periodic share refreshing whichmeans
that an adversary is required to compromise at least t servers
before these shares refresh. Verifiable threshold cryptography
includes a method of verifying the correctness of shares such
that a compromised server can be detected when its incorrect
share is used in an attempt to create a valid signature.
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the certificate issuing phase, and the
share updating phase. In the first phase, the network initial-
ization phase, an offline trusted authority creates a master
public-private key pair. The master public key is made public
and the master private key is divided into n shares using a
(n, t) proactive threshold cryptography scheme [98]–[102].
The shares are then distributed to n nodes inside the net-
work which will function as the distributed CA. These nodes
are called servers. This process is illustrated in Fig. 6(a).
Zhou and Haas [93] did not mention a method for
selecting servers, however [105]–[111] proposed to select
servers based on physical security and computational
ability, [112], [113] proposed to select servers which have a
high success ratio of providing key management services,
and [114], [115] proposed to select the maximum clique in
a trust graph as servers. Each server stores the public keys
of all the nodes in the network, including the other servers,
so they have a secure channel. Every node wishing to be part
of the network creates their own public-private key pair. The
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FIGURE 6. Illustration of the three main phases in the partially distributed certificate authority-based approach. (a) Network initialization phase.
(b) Certificate issuing phase. (c) Share updating phase.
following two phases are performed throughout the entire
lifetime of the network.
In the second phase, the certificate issuing phase, nodes
wishing to be part of the network or nodes whose certificate
is soon to expire contact at least t servers to issue a certificate.
To contact t servers, it is assumed that [93] would resort
to flooding the network with certificate issuing requests.
To reduce delay and communication overhead, [105]–[108]
proposed to use cached routing information and [110], [111]
proposed to have the servers form a multicast group such that
a requesting node only requires to contact a single (uncom-
promised) server. Nodes provide the servers with identifying
information and their public key. Then each server creates
a partial signature and sends this to a so-called combiner.
Any server can act as a combiner and Zhou and Haas [93]
proposed to have t servers act as combiners to create at
least one valid signature in the presence of compromised
servers. After a combiner receives t partial signatures, it com-
bines these into a certificate signature. The combiner can
verify its correctness with the public master key before
transmitting it to the requesting node. This process is illus-
trated in Fig. 6(b). To reduce the communication overhead
of the servers, [105]–[111] proposed to have servers trans-
mit the partial signatures directly to the requesting node
which combines these into its signed certificate. The use of
self-certifying keys [116] was proposed in [117] since these
require nodes to contact servers only once.
In the third phase, the share updating phase, servers update
their individual shares to prevent mobile adversaries [118]
from collecting t shares. Each server creates subshares which
it distributes to the other servers. Then, each server com-
bines their original share with the received subshares to
create a new share. This new share is independent of the
previous share, meaning that a mobile adversary is unable
to use previously obtained shares to reconstruct the mas-
ter private key. This process is illustrated in Fig. 6(c).
Algorithms for periodic share updating and share updating
due to servers leaving and/or joining the server group are
provided in [110], [111], [119].
The certificate revocation mechanism in [108] proposed
that servers create partially signed revocation certificates and
broadcast these through the network using flooding. These
partial revocation certificates are stored locally in each node’s
certificate revocation list (CRL). When a node receives t par-
tially signed revocation certificates, it creates the fully signed
revocation certificate which is then accepted as legitimate.
Alternatively, [110], [111] proposed that nodes report misbe-
havior to the multicast server group. At least some threshold
u accusations (from u nodes) are required in order to revoke
a node’s certificate. Revoked certificates are periodically
broadcasted and locally stored on a node’s CRL. The identity
of accusers is also stored at servers to track any false accusers.
To measure trust of individual nodes, [120], [121] proposed
the use of a TrustManagement systemwhich decides whether
a node is trustworthy enough to receive key management
services. This trust is measured by the node’s success rate of
transmitting data during its lifetime in the network.
To increase scalability and improve availability by dis-
tributing the servers evenly, [122] proposed to have the net-
work partitioned into clusters such that each cluster-head
maintains the cluster structure and acts as a server of the
PD-CA. This inspired more research into a PD-CA with a
clustered architecture [123]–[128]. To reduce the memory
storage requirement, [129]–[132] proposed key management
schemes relying on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [133].
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is met since the offline TTP dis-
tributes shares which provide trustworthiness in the collec-
tively signed certificates. Verifiable threshold cryptography
allows the detection of malicious behavior and proactive
threshold cryptography provides robustness against mobile
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adversaries. However, a node wishing to join the network
could be vulnerable to a MITM attack [134]. A malicious
node could provide the joining nodewith a falsemaster public
key for which the malicious node has the corresponding
master private key. Fortunately, this attack can be prevented
when at least t combiners transmit the master public key
along with the signed certificate.
The overhead requirement is not met. The expensive
certificate management and certificate distribution in this
PD-CA-based approach is believed to cause a large communi-
cation overhead for a moderate to large network which covers
the urban landscape.
The scalability requirement is not met either. The scalabil-
ity of the network is strongly related to the number of servers
acting as the distributed CA since these servers must provide
all network nodes with certification services. A growth in
the number of network nodes increases the pressure on these
servers and subsequently reduces its battery life. For mobile
small cells it is reasonable to assume that the number of
nodes fluctuate over time and could drastically increase in
certain areas during sporting events, concerts and national
celebrations. The limited amount of servers could become
incapable of providing keymanagement services at this point.
This scheme is therefore not scalable from a connectivity per-
spective. Temporary on-demand auxiliary servers, proposed
in [109], [135], may be able to reduce the severity of this
problem.
The sustainability requirement is met. Although it is rea-
sonable to assume that the assigned servers acting as a dis-
tributed CA may leave the network at some point, resulting
in an unavailable key management service followed by a
disconnected network, a solution to this problem has been
proposed. The key management scheme [136] is also based
on a partially distributed authority (although based on cer-
tificateless PKC) and proposed a mechanism to replace a
server node in the event that one would leave the network.
Due to the similarities of the key management structure,
it is assumed that this mechanism can be easily adopted
in the PD-CA-based approach. This approach is therefore
sustainable from a connectivity perspective. Furthermore,
an extensive network lifetime does not improve the abilities
of adversaries to break security or worsen issues related to
overhead.
The fairness requirement is not met due to the imbalance
of overhead between network nodes. Even if servers are
replaced periodically in an attempt to fairly distribute the
key management tasks and its associated overhead over time,
user’s mobile devices which are temporarily assigned as a
server may still choose to act selfishly.
No issues have been identified related to the connec-
tivity and secure routing independence requirement. Based
on these evaluations, the authors believe that the PD-CA-
based key management approach will not be able to provide
efficient and effective key management to support cryp-
tographic protocols to secure a network of mobile small
cells.
E. FULLY DISTRIBUTED CA-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The fully distributed CA-based approach (FD-CA) was intro-
duced by Luo et al. in [137]. This approach distributes
the trust from an ordinary centralized CA evenly among
all the network nodes and is therefore called fully dis-
tributed. This approach was later simulated and implemented
in [138]–[140].
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Similar to the PD-CA-based key management approach,
the general idea is to distribute trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to a set of network nodes due to MANETs
being unable to support a centralized CA. In this FD-CA-
based key management approach, trust is distributed among
all the nodes. It is assumed that each node has some one-hop
neighborhood discovery mechanism and that they have at
least t one-hop neighbors at any time. Upon network initial-
ization, a master private key and the corresponding master
public key are created. The master public key is made public
to all network nodes while the master private key is divided
into t shares and distributed to a cluster of t neighboring
nodes. The cluster of t neighboring nodes, each in possession
of a share of the master private key, is able to collaboratively
create new shares for its one-hop neighbors. This mechanism
is used to spread shares to all the nodes inside the network in a
scalable manner. It is also used to provide nodes with a share
when they join the network. Similar to the PD-CA-based
approach, proactive threshold cryptography [98] and veri-
fiable threshold cryptography [103], [141], [142] are com-
bined to create, verify, and update shares in order to provide
robustness against mobile adversaries [118] and DoS attacks.
Each node creates their own private and corresponding public
key after which they broadcast a request to their neighboring
nodes to have its public key certified. When the node receives
t − 1 responses of partial signatures, it combines these with
its own share to create a new fully signed certificate. Any
node requesting its certificate can verify its authenticity with
the master public key and can therefore be safely distributed
through the network. This proposal is designed to provide key
management in wireless ad hoc networks which are dynamic,
scalable and have a high node density.
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of three main phases. The network ini-
tialization phase, the certificate renewal phase, and the share
updating phase. In the first phase, the network initialization
phase, an offline trusted authority creates a master private key
(MSK ) and the corresponding master public key (MPK ). The
master public key is made public and the master private key
is divided into t shares using a t-out-of-t proactive thresh-
old cryptography scheme [98]. These shares (s1, s2, . . . , st )
are then distributed to a cluster of t neighboring nodes
(N1,N2, . . . ,Nt ) inside the network. Nodes within broadcast
range of at least t nodes with system shares, send a request to
obtain their own system share. This system share is obtained
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FIGURE 7. Illustration of the three main phases in the fully distributed certificate authority-based approach. (a) Network initialization phase.
(b) Certificate renewal phase. (c) Share updating phase.
following the 2-round protocol described in [137], [138] and
over time distributed to all the nodes inside the network.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 7(a). During network oper-
ation, the same process is used to distribute a secret share to
nodes joining the network. However, [143] demonstrated by
example that the obtained secret share of a joining node is
not verifiable. Various other schemes proposed to establish a
cluster-based [144], [145] or a logical tree-based [146]–[148]
hierarchy to organize the key management service. It is
assumed that a node which joins the network already obtained
an initial certificate, either from an offline authority or from
a coalition of t networking nodes. The following two phases
are performed sequentially throughout the entire lifetime of
the network.
In the second phase, the certificate renewal phase, nodes
whose certificate is soon to expire broadcast a request for a
certificate renewal. It is assumed that each node is equipped
with some detection mechanism to detect misbehaving nodes
among its one-hop neighborhood. When neighbors receive
the request and have no reason to believe that the requesting
node is not a well-behaving node, it responds with a par-
tial signature. This process is illustrated in Fig. 7(b). The
requesting node can verify the correctness of the received
partial signatures and combines t correct partial signatures
to sign and renew its certificate. To reduce the computational
overhead, [146] proposed the use of algorithms based on the
discrete logarithm problem since these are more efficient than
the originally proposed RSA-based algorithms.
In the third phase, the share updating phase, a random
node creates a coalition of t nodes to initiate share updat-
ing. Luo and Lu [137] and Luo et al. [139] proposed a
sequential process which is based on the share distribution
during network initialization, and a parallel share update
process. In the parallel share update process the coalition
collaboratively generates, encrypts, and signs an update poly-
nomial. This update polynomial is then distributed to all
the nodes inside the network by flooding. This process is
illustrated in Fig. 7(c). Each node receiving the encrypted
and signed update polynomial can check its authenticity and
decrypt it with the master public key. Then, each node sends
a broadcast message requesting subshares from its one-hop
neighbors. Upon receiving t valid subshares the node is able
to update its master private key share. At the end of each share
updating phase the old shares will be destroyed and the new
shares are used to handle certificate renewal requests in the
next certificate renewal phase.
Luo and Lu [137] and Luo et al. [139] assumed that each
node is equipped with some detection mechanism to identify
misbehaving nodes in its one-hop neighborhood. An example
of a distributed detection mechanism is [149]. Each node
maintains monitoring records on neighboring nodes and a
certificate revocation list (CRL). Based on the monitoring
records, a node may believe that a neighboring node is misbe-
having. In this case, an accusation message is created, signed,
and locally distributed. Each node receiving the accusation
checks if they believe the accuser is to be trusted and if so,
they create an entry in their CRL with the suspected node’s
ID and a list of its accusers. A total of t accusations are
necessary to convict a node and therefore prevents amalicious
node from falsely accusing and convicting a well-behaving
node. Once a node is convicted, the t accusers create a
signed conviction certificate and distributes this through the
network. The extent of the conviction certificate distribution
depends on the time that the convicted node’s certificate is
still valid. The distribution must cover enough nodes inside
the network to prevent the convicted node from ‘‘escaping’’
to a new neighborhood to successfully renew its certificate
before it expires. Nodes with expired certificates are believed
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to be malicious and are unable to obtain a new certificate.
Also, in order tominimize the storage requirement of the CRL
it is proposed to remove entries of convicted nodes once their
certificate has expired.
Various researchers proposed to make the threshold t
dynamic to maximize the availability and security at any
time. It is proposed to reduce the threshold value t when
the network density decreases in order to keep certification
services available [150], and to increase the threshold value
t when the network density increases in order to provide
security [151]. Alternatively, [152], [153] recognized that the
FD-CA approach provides availability at the cost of security
compared to the PD-CA approach and proposes a middle way
in which nodes have duplicate secret shares.
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is met since the offline TTP dis-
tributes shares which provide trustworthiness in the collec-
tively signed certificates. Verifiable threshold cryptography
allows the detection of malicious behavior and proactive
threshold cryptography provides robustness against mobile
adversaries. However, a node wishing to join the network
could be vulnerable to a MITM attack [134]. A malicious
node could provide the joining node with a false master
public key for which the malicious node has the corre-
sponding master private key. Fortunately, this attack can
be avoided by having t well-behaving nodes transmit the
master public key along with the partial signature since a
mobile adversary is assumed to be incapable of simultane-
ously controlling t network nodes. Furthermore, the FD-CA-
based approach is vulnerable to a Sybil attack [87]. In the
Sybil attack a malicious user takes on multiple (in this case
at least t) identities, thereby representing multiple nodes of
which each has the ability to obtain a share derived from the
master private key. For example, the malicious user could
purchase t mobile devices and register these with different
network providers in order to successfully register t devices
and obtain t shares. This would allow the malicious user
to recreate the entire master private key and break security
within the system. This attack can be prevented by imple-
menting policies, such as limiting the distribution of shares
to one share per identity (which can be maintained through
identity authentication) instead of one share per mobile
device/SIM.
The overhead requirement is not met. The expensive
certificate management and certificate distribution in this
FD-CA-based approach is believed to cause a large communi-
cation overhead for a moderate to large network which covers
the urban landscape.
No issues have been identified related to the connec-
tivity, scalability, sustainability, fairness and secure rout-
ing independence requirement. Based on these evaluations,
the authors believe that the FD-CA-based key management
approach will not be able to provide efficient and effective
keymanagement to support cryptographic protocols to secure
a network of mobile small cells.
V. IDENTITY-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
Identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) [38] was
first proposed by Shamir in 1984, but it was not until
2001 when Boneh and Franklin [39], [40] introduced the
first practical ID-based cryptosystem. This scheme was later
extended by Lynn [154] to provide message authentication
at no additional cost. This form of public key cryptography
originated from the burden of obtaining authenticated public
keys and the need to reduce the memory requirement from
storing certificates. In ID-based cryptography, the identity
(e.g., network address, phone number) is used to derive a
node’s public key. This information is already supposed to
be known to a node wishing to communicate with another
node. Therefore, this ID-based public key effectively removes
the necessity to authenticate and distribute public keys. The
private key is obtained from a trusted party called the Private
Key Generator (PKG). This PKG combines a master private
key with a node’s identity to create that node’s private key.
However, this comes at the cost of having the PKG as a
single-point-of-attack and it is capable of computing and
storing every node’s private key, also known as the key escrow
problem. The obtained private key can be used to decrypt
and sign messages. Suppose that node A wishes to send a
message to node B. First, node A creates a message, encrypts
its message with the identity of node B and then creates a
signature using its own private key. Finally, node A sends
the encrypted message, the created signature and its identity
to node B. Node B can verify the signature with node A’s
identity, concludes that the message comes from node A and
then decrypts the message with its private key.
This chapter discusses three approaches of establish-
ing secure, efficient, and reliable key management initially
designed for MANETs and relying on ID-PKC. The first
approach (pre-distribution-based key management) includes
an offline trusted authority which distributes keying material
to network nodes prior to joining the network. The keying
material includes both public and private keys which are used
to establish secure communication channels between nodes in
a scalable manner and minimizes communication overhead.
The identity of nodes is used to derive which keys should be
used in establishing secure communication. The following
two approaches (partially distributed PKG-based key man-
agement and fully distributed PKG-based key management)
provide private keys to network nodes by distributing the
private key generating task of a centralized PKG to a subset
or to all of the nodes inside the network.
A. PRE-DISTRIBUTION-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The pre-distribution-based key management approach was
introduced by He et al. in [155], [156].
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
This approach utilizes combinatorics to distribute public and
private keys while minimizing the memory storage require-
ment. In a typical network of n nodes, each node stores one
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FIGURE 8. Illustration of the three main phases in the pre-distribution-based approach. (a) Network initialization phase. (b) Secure communication
establishment phase. (c) New node joining phase.
private key and n public keys such that every pair of nodes
have access to a secure communications channel. However,
in such a key pre-distribution scheme the memory storage
requirement grows linearly with the size of the network.
In the approach introduced by He et al. [155], [156], a trusted
authority generates a pool of public-private key pairs large
enough such that every node will be provided with a unique
combination of private keys. This trusted authority will be
offline during network deployment. For example, a network
of 10 nodes only requires 5 public-private key pairs. Prior
to network deployment, each node will be provided with a
unique combination of 2 private keys along with the entire
pool of public keys. The memory storage requirement in this
case is limited to 7 keys. The use of combinatorics to dis-
tribute keys means that the memory storage requirement only
grows logarithmically and that makes this approach highly
scalable. After a node receives its unique set of private keys,
it derives its identity from the indexes of the received private
keys. By exchanging identities between nodes, each node can
derive which private keys another node has and uses the cor-
responding public keys to secure data. Only the intended node
possesses the correct combination of private keys, providing
security. When nodes wish to join the network, they would
contact the trusted authority in an offline fashion to obtain
their unique set of keys. If not enough unique combinations
exist anymore, the offline authority generates additional keys.
The additional keys will then be introduced into the network
by the newly joining node, provided with a signature which
could have only been created by the offline authority.
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the secure communication establishment
phase, and the new node joining phase. In the first phase,
the network initialization phase, an offline PKG generates a
pool of mathematically linked public and private key pairs.
The size of this pool of keys is dependent on the number
of nodes which are projected to be participating in the net-
work. Suppose a network is projected to contain ten nodes.
Instead of ordinarily providing each nodewith a single unique
public-private key pair and nine public keys related to the
remaining nine nodes, this scheme proposes the use of combi-
natorics to minimize the memory requirement. To accommo-
date ten nodes with keying material, only five public-private
key pairs are necessary. Each node, before joining the online
network, would receive a random and unique combination
of two private keys along with the pool of five public keys
from the PKG. This example effectively reduces the number
of keys stored at a node from 11 to 7. The identity of the
node is then derived from the indexes of the obtained private
keys. Since the set of private keys is unique for every node,
the identities will also be unique. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 8(a). Notice that a node must use all of their private
keys to sign or decrypt a single message to provide security.
Algorithms provided in [155], [156] estimate the most opti-
mal values for public-private key pool size and the number of
private keys to be held by every node for an arbitrary network
size while considering the objectives of memory efficiency,
computational complexity and resilience requirement. To fur-
ther reduce the memory storage requirement, [157], [158]
proposed a clustering-hierarchy and requires nodes to only
store the public keys of its cluster members. This only pro-
vides intra-cluster communication whereas inter-cluster com-
munication has to be routed through the cluster-head. Also,
cluster-heads are assigned to provide each cluster-member
with appropriate keys upon dynamic member changes. This
proposal fails the fairness requirement and causes addi-
tional communication overhead by trying to improving on an
already low memory storage overhead.
In the second phase, the secure communication establish-
ment phase, a node A wishes to communicate with another
node B. First, the node A sends a message to request the iden-
tity of node B. Then, node B responds with its identity IDB.
NodeA inspects the identity of nodeB and derives the indexes
of the private keys that node B possesses. Node A uses the
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FIGURE 9. Illustration of the three main phases in the partially distributed private key generator-based approach. (a) Network initialization phase.
(b) Private key issuing phase. (c) Share updating phase.
public keys corresponding to the private keys in possession
by node B to encrypt its data and securely transmits this data.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 8(b). He et al. [155], [156]
proposed that each node its identity is a binary string of
the indexes of the private keys it possesses. For example,
the network of ten nodes has a total of five public-private
key pairs. Suppose that a node received private key number
0 and private key number 3. It concatenates the binary values
of these numbers to create its identity, in this case 000||011.
Any other node wishing to securely communicate then uses
public key number 0 and public key number 3 to encrypt its
message. Since the identity of a node is used to establish
secure communication, this key management approach is
classified as an identity-based approach.
In the third phase, the new node joining phase, new nodes
contact the offline PKG to obtain its keying material such
that they can join the network. If there are still unused
combinations of private keys available, the PKG provides
each joining node with a random and unused combination
of private keys and the entire pool of public keys. Finally,
the new nodes derive their identity from the obtained private
keys. If all possible private key combinations are in use then
the PKG must generate additional public-private key pairs to
accommodate the new nodes. The new nodes obtain a new
unique combination of private keys from the offline PKG and
the extended pool of public keys. The node then derives its
identity from the indexes of the obtained private keys. Once
the new nodes go online, they broadcast the newly introduced
public keys to every network node. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 8(c). If the number of public keys has grown to a
higher power of 2 then every node also updates their identity
to contain sufficient bits. To prevent malicious nodes from
broadcasting fake public keys, the offline PKG should sign
the newly generated public keys.
He et al. [155], [156]mentioned that key revocation should
be organized by the offline PKG since this authority also gen-
erates and maintains all the cryptographic keys. The offline
PKG could resort to signing key revocation messages with
every private key in the key pool, since only the offline
PKG has access to these and every node has the public keys
to verify the message. However, it is not mentioned which
entity distributes these revocation messages since the PKG is
considered to be offline.
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is not met. He et al. [155] state
that their scheme is secure against an identity impersonation
attack, since a malicious node sending the identity of another
node leads to an encryptedmessage which the malicious node
is unable to decrypt. However, this scheme is vulnerable to
an identity replacement attack. When a node A wishes the
obtain the identity of a node B, but intermediate malicious
node C replaces the identity of B for its own identity then the
malicious node can decrypt any message sent by A intended
for B. This attack is possible since the identity in this key
management scheme is not derived from public knowledge,
but works like a public key which requires verification for
authenticity. Furthermore, the combinatorics approach which
minimizes the memory requirement causes vulnerabilities
against a mobile adversary. Suppose that node A (in posses-
sion of private keys sk1 and sk2) and node B (in possession
of private keys sk3 and sk4) are compromised. Every node in
possession of any other combination of two of these four pri-
vate keys are now vulnerable to malicious attacks. Similarly,
a malicious node launching a Sybil attack [87] could collect
private keys in order to break the security of nodes having a
combination of the obtained private keys.
The connectivity requirement is conditionally met. Under
the assumption that identities can be securely exchanged
and since every well-behaving network node is capable
of obtaining its set of private keys, every arbitrary set of
nodes is capable of establishing a secure channel, providing
connectivity.
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The sustainability requirement is not met. This is due to
the lack of a proposed mechanism which deals with nodes
leaving the network. If the key management allows the reuse
of private key combinations and identities, then each node
leaving the network has to contact the offline PKG such that
it will be aware of recycling keyingmaterial. Then, the offline
PKG could decide to send a revocation message to announce
the inactivity of a formerly used identity. However, such a
message only presents itself when another node joins the net-
work. Furthermore, dynamic changes in networkmembership
would cause the constant flood of messages throughout the
network. It may therefore be more beneficial to not resort to
the recycling of keying material. This means that every node
will have a unique set of private keys and identity provided
for the entire lifetime of the network. Due to the logarithmic
growth of the memory requirement the overhead may still be
acceptable, however key revocation messages will become
unable to inform all network accessed nodes of compromised
keys. It is necessary to create an efficient mechanism to
deal with nodes leaving the network in order to satisfy the
sustainability requirement.
The secure routing independence requirement is not met.
This is due to fact that identities in this key management
approach are created, like public keys are. Since these iden-
tities cannot be verified, they are vulnerable to replacement
attacks by malicious intermediate nodes. The secure distri-
bution of identities of multiple hops would require a secure
routing protocol.
No issues have been identified related to the overhead, scal-
ability and fairness requirement. Based on these evaluations,
the authors believe that the pre-distribution-based key man-
agement approach will not be able to provide efficient and
effective key management to support cryptographic protocols
to secure a network of mobile small cells.
B. PARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED PKG-BASED KEY
MANAGEMENT
The partially distributed PKG-based approach (PD-PKG)
was introduced by Khalili et al. in [134]. This approach dis-
tributes the trust from an ordinary centralized PKG to a proper
subset of network nodes and is therefore called partially
distributed.
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The general idea of the PD-PKG-based key management
approach is distributing the trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to a subset of nodes inside the network while
keeping the overhead as low as possible. The distribution of
trust is necessary since a MANET (for which it is designed)
is unable to support a centralized PKG. Instead, the nodes
forming the distributed PKGwill provide network nodes with
their private keys. Upon network initialization, n participating
nodes create a master private key and the corresponding
master public key in a distributed fashion. The master private
key is created using the proposed t-out-of-n threshold cryp-
tography scheme [159]. A node wishing to join the network
uses its identity as its public key and contacts t of the initial
nodes to construct its private key from the collected t partial
private keys. An adversary wishing to break the security of
the system must compromise t of the initial nodes during
the lifetime of the network [118]. To prevent this attack from
being successful, Khalili et al. [134] proposed to include
proactive threshold cryptography. This means that shares are
periodically refreshed such that it becomes impossible for
an adversary to compromise t of the initial nodes within
a share refreshing period. This provides robustness against
active attackers.
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the private key issuing phase, and the
share updating phase. In the first phase, the network initial-
ization phase, a set of n nodes collaboratively initialize the
network by deciding on mutually acceptable security param-
eters. These security parameters include the threshold value t ,
particular parameters of underlying ID-based cryptographic
schemes (e.g., key length), and a policy for key issuing. This
initial set of nodes then creates the master private key and the
corresponding master public key in a distributed fashion. The
master private key is created using the proposed t-out-of-n
threshold cryptography scheme [159] such that each of the n
initial nodes obtains one share. This scheme also supports the
verification of the shares. These nodes form the distributed
PKG for an ID-based scheme, exchange their identities and
start issuing private keys to each other. The master public
key will be provided to all nodes joining the network. This
process is illustrated in Fig. 9(a). Alternatively, [160]–[164]
proposed to have an offline trusted authority select security
parameters, create the master key-pair, and distribute shares
of the master private key to n nodes in order to prevent any
malicious nodes from establishing insecure key management
during the network initialization phase.
In the second phase, the private key issuing phase, a node
wishing to obtain its private key contacts at least t nodes
which are a part of the PKG bymoving into their transmission
range. The node provides PKG-nodes with its identity and
truthfully follows the key issuing policy to obtain partial
private keys. This node can use t correct partial private keys
to construct its personal private key. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 9(b). To prevent adversaries from launching an imper-
sonation attack, PKG-nodes should refuse to issue keys for a
particular identity more than once. However, this will only be
effective if n < 2× k and it requires PKG-nodes to store the
identities for which they already issued a partial private key.
A multi-level hierarchical scheme was proposed in [165] in
which a threshold of sibling nodes or parent nodes can issue
a private key. In contacting the PKG-nodes, [160], [162] pro-
posed to use the anonymous routing protocol MASK [166]
to hide a nodes’ identity by using pseudonyms. This prevents
mobile adversaries from uncovering the PKG-nodes, there-
fore having to resort to compromising random nodes which
significantly increasing the security of the system. However,
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this may pose a problem when it comes to the secure routing
interdependency problem.
For long-term networks, [161]–[164] introduced an addi-
tional public-private key updating phase. Private keys can
be cryptanalyzed when the network lifetime is long enough,
meaning that these keys also require to be updated period-
ically. To do this, the public key is created from a com-
bination of the identity and a time stamp or key updating
phase number which corresponds to a unique private key
for every period between public-private key updating phases.
In [165], [167], [168] a scheme is proposed in which network
nodes determine which t out of n PKG-nodes are most likely
to be well-behaving and should be contacted for key manage-
ment services. This can significantly reduce the communica-
tion overhead when t trustworthy PKG-nodes are contacted
periodically.
In the third phase, the share updating phase, the nodes
forming the distributed PKG update their shares using proac-
tive threshold cryptography [118] to prevent mobile adver-
saries from uncovering the master private key. Due to the
exchange of identities and the issuance of private keys during
the network initialization phase, these nodes have access
to a secure channel to exchange subshares. This process is
illustrated in Fig. 9(c).
Key revocation mechanisms were proposed
in [161]–[163], [169] which use a Node Revocation List
(NRL).When a node notices misbehavior from a neighboring
node, it broadcasts an accusation to all the nodes inside the
network. The accused node is now classified as ‘‘suspect’’ in
every node’s NRL. When a threshold amount of accusations
is received within a certain time period, every node will
reclassify the suspected node as ‘‘convicted’’. Any node
will refuse communication or key management service to
a convicted node and any accusations which came from a
convicted node will be removed in each node’s NRL.
To increase the scalability of this approach, [170] proposed
the use of a clustered hierarchy in which the cluster-heads
form the distributed PKG.
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is conditionally met. As long as
the initial n nodes initializing the network are well-behaving,
trust is distributed throughout the network and the proper
creation of private keys can be verified with the master pub-
lic key. Proactive threshold cryptography provides robust-
ness against mobile adversaries and verifiable threshold
cryptography could be adopted from previously proposed
schemes [93], [137] to allow easy detection of malicious
behavior. Khalili et al. [134] mentioned that a node wishing
to join the network could be vulnerable to a MITM attack.
A malicious node could provide the joining node with a false
master public key for which the malicious node has the cor-
responding master private key. Fortunately, this attack can be
avoided when at least t PKG-nodes transmit the master public
key along with the private key share. Furthermore, ID-PKC is
known to suffer from the key escrow problem. This becomes
problematic when an adversary is able to reconstruct the
master private key. However, it is assumed that no adversary
is able to collect at least t master private key shares within a
share refreshing period.
The scalability requirement is not met. The scalability of
the network is strongly related to the number of PKG-nodes
acting as the distributed PKG since these PKG-nodes must
provide all the network nodes with key management services.
This means that a growth in the number of network nodes
also increases the pressure on these PKG-nodes and subse-
quently reducing its battery life. It is reasonable to assume
that the number of nodes in the mobile small cells fluctu-
ate over time and could drastically increase in certain areas
during sporting events, concerts and national celebrations.
The limited amount of PKG-nodes could become incapable
of providing key management services at this point. Khalili
et al. [134] stated that network nodes are required to inter-
act with the PKG-nodes only once in order to obtain their
private key which reduces the impact, although this may not
be enough to considered this scheme to be scalable from
a connectivity perspective. Temporary on-demand auxiliary
PKG-nodes could be adopted as a solution, as proposed in the
PD-CA-based approaches [109], [135].
The sustainability requirement is met. Although it is rea-
sonable to assume that the assigned PKG-nodes acting as
a distributed PKG may leave the network at some point,
resulting in an unavailable key management service followed
by a disconnected network. A solution to this problem has
been proposed in [136]. This key management scheme is also
based on a partially distributed authority (although relying
on certificateless PKC) and proposed a mechanism to replace
a PKG-node in the event that one would leave the network.
Due to the similarities of the key management structures, it is
assumed that this mechanism can be easily adopted in the PD-
PKG-based approach. This approach is therefore sustainable
from a connectivity perspective. Furthermore, an increased
network lifetime does not improve the abilities of adversaries
to break security or worsen issues related to overhead.
The fairness requirement is not met due to the imbalance
of overhead between network nodes. Even if PKG-nodes are
replaced periodically in an attempt to fairly distribute the
key management tasks and its associated overhead over time,
user’s mobile devices which are temporarily assigned as a
PKG-node may still choose to act selfishly.
No issues have been identified related to the connectiv-
ity, overhead and secure routing independence requirement.
Based on these evaluations, the authors believe that the PD-
PKG-based key management approach will not be able to
provide efficient and effective key management to support
cryptographic protocols to secure a network of mobile small
cells.
C. FULLY DISTRIBUTED PKG-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The fully distributed PKG-based approach (PD-PKG) was
introduced by Deng et al. in [171], [172]. This approach dis-
tributes the trust from an ordinary centralized PKG evenly
VOLUME 7, 2019 59219
M. D. Ree et al.: Key Management for Beyond 5G Mobile Small Cells: A Survey
FIGURE 10. Illustration of the three main phases in the fully distributed private key generator-based approach. (a) Network initialization phase.
(b) Public-private key issuing phase. (c) Master private key sharing phase.
among all the network nodes and is therefore called fully
distributed.
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Similar to the PD-PKG-based key management approach,
the general idea is to distribute trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to a set of network nodes due to MANETs
(for which it is designed) being unable to support a central-
ized PKG. In this FD-PKG-based key management approach,
trust is distributed among all the nodes. Upon network initial-
ization, all the nodeswishing to participate in the network col-
laborate to generate a master private key using the proposed
t-out-of-n threshold cryptography scheme [173] of which
each node will hold a share. A master public key share is
computed from these and then distributed to every network
node such that everyone is able to construct the master public
key. When a node wishes to join the network, it needs to
broadcasts a request with identifying information to at least
t neighboring nodes. These neighboring nodes decide on an
expiration time, create the node’s public key, and broadcasts
this to all the nodes within the network. Then, each neigh-
boring node uses their master private key share to create a
share of the joining node’s private key and a partial share
for the joining node’s master private key. These are then
securely distributed to the joining node which can construct
its private key and its master private key share upon obtain-
ing t responses. This scheme is combined with verifiable
threshold cryptography so the authenticity of the shares can
be verified.
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the public-private key issuing phase, and
the master private key sharing phase. In the first phase,
the network initialization phase, the n initial nodes col-
laboratively initialize the network by deciding on mutually
acceptable security parameters and generating the master key
pair. Deng et al. [171] and Deng and Agrawal [172] pro-
posed using the threshold cryptography scheme as described
in [173], since it removes the necessity of a trusted authority.
In this scheme, each node contributes to the generation of
the master private key by generating their own secret and
then distribute subshares to the other nodes. Once the nodes
receive all their subshares, they combine these to create
their share of the master private key. It is assumed that
the distribution of subshares take place offline since there
is no mechanism in place yet to do this securely online.
In [174], [175] it is proposed that nodes first distribute a tem-
porary public-private key pair to enable the online distribution
of shares. The master private key shares are then combined
with a common parameter to create master public key shares.
Each node broadcasts their master public key share such
that every node can compute the master public key. This
process is illustrated in Fig. 10(a). To remove any malicious
nodes participating in the initialization process, [176], [177]
proposed that nodes receiving faulty subshares broadcast this
as a complaint. To avoid any malicious nodes participating in
this process, [178] proposed to use an offline TA to initialize
the system and distribute master private key shares. It is
proposed by Deng et al. [171] and Deng and Agrawal [172]
to adopt a verifiable threshold cryptography scheme to detect
any invalid shares generated in the process, however there
is no consensus which particular scheme should be used.
Pedersen’s verifiable threshold cryptography scheme [104]
was proposed in [177], [179], Feldman’s scheme [103] was
proposed in [176] and Harn and Lin’s scheme [180] was
proposed in [175]. The following two phases are performed
during the entire lifetime of the network.
The second phase, the public-private key issuing phase,
is triggered when a node wishes to join the network or when
a node’s public key is about to expire. This node contacts
at least t neighboring nodes to obtain its new public-private
key pair. To reduce the communication overhead and delay,
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[167] proposed to only contact the t most trustworthy nodes
for key renewal. The most trustworthy nodes are selected
based on local information from monitoring neighboring
nodes. A joining node broadcasts a request in which it shares
its identity ID and its MAC address, which are assumed to be
unique and unchangeable. The neighboring nodes decide on
the expiration time of the public key and create the public
key pkID = H (ID||MAC||Expire_time) [141]. The MAC
address and the expiration time are included in the public
key to protect it against IP spoofing attacks and compromised
private keys. However, the variable Expire_time may prevent
a node’s public key from being directly derived from publicly
available information. It is therefore proposed that the neigh-
boring nodes broadcast the node’s public key (also called the
network identifier NID) to everyone in the network. Instead,
periodically updating public keys such that the public key is
a concatenation of the identity and the period index number
was proposed in [177]. However, this requires some form of
synchronization and every node would send requests for a
new private key at the same time. To reduce the communi-
cation overhead, [179] proposed to create the public key by
concatenating the identity with a time stamp of issuing and
that nodes only renew their public-private key pair when the
node suspects that its key has been compromised. Unfortu-
nately, this allows undetected compromised nodes to remain
validated and cause further security issues [181]. After the
public key is established, the neighboring nodes combine the
node’s public key with their share of the master private key to
generate shares of the node’s private key. These private key
shares are distributed to the requesting node who combines
these to create its private key. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 10(b). A detailed key issuing protocol is described
in [178] and claims to be resistant against replay attacks,
MITM attacks and insider attacks without relying on a secure
channel. However, this protocol relies on joining nodes to
publish a hashed password along with their identity which
need to be stored at network nodes and therefore eliminates
the memory requirement advantage of ID-based schemes.
The third phase, the master private key sharing phase, fol-
lows the previous phase when a node joins the network. This
node’s identity has just been authenticated by its neighboring
nodes and obtained its public-private key pair. These same
neighboring nodes create a partial share of the master private
key using their individual share. In order to protect the secrecy
of the shares of these neighboring nodes, they may have to
resort to some shuffling mechanism [138]. The neighboring
nodes then distribute the partial shares to the joining node
which combines them into its own master private key share.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 10(c). To securely distribute
the shares of the private key and the master private key, Deng
et al. proposed that the joining node presents a self-generated
temporary public key pktemp which the neighboring service
nodes use to encrypt the (master) private key shares before
distributing these to the requesting node. A slightly alter-
native approach was presented in [182], which uses Feld-
man’s verifiable threshold cryptography scheme [103] to
create master private key shares which would also act as
a node’s private key. These shares are verifiable using the
identity (or public key) of the node owning the share and
can therefore act as the private key, simplifying the key
management by combining the key issuing and the master
private key sharing phases. This scheme is also based on the
discrete logarithm problem instead of elliptic curves which
improves computational efficiency.
It is proposed in [179] that the network lifetime should be
divided into two distinct phases. An operational phase (con-
taining the public-private key issuing phase and the master
private key sharing phase for joining nodes) and a master
private key share updating phase. During the master private
key share updating phase a coalition of t nodes collaborate to
generate a random share updating polynomial. Nodes within
this coalition create subshares for each other and are dis-
tributed. These subshares allow the coalition to update their
master private key share. However, no details are provided
how nodes outside the coalition are supposed to update their
master private key shares.
Deng et al. [171] and Deng and Agrawal [172] did not
provide any details about key revocation. Revocation mech-
anisms are proposed in [169] and [181]. In these schemes
a Node Revocation List (NRL), analogous to the CRL in
certificate-based key management, is proposed. When a node
notices misbehavior from a neighboring node, it broadcasts
an accusation to all the nodes inside the network. The accused
node is now classified as a ‘‘suspect’’ in every node’s NRL.
When a threshold amount of accusations is received within a
certain time period, every node will reclassify the suspected
node as ‘‘revoked’’. Any node will refuse communication or
key management service to a revoked node and any accusa-
tions which came from a revoked node will be removed in
each node’s NRL.
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is conditionally met. As long
as the initial n nodes initializing the network are well-
behaving, trust is distributed throughout the network such
that the proper creation of private keys can be veri-
fied with the master public key. Proactive threshold cryp-
tography could be adopted from previously proposed
schemes [93], [134], [137]–[140] to provide robustness
against mobile adversaries [118] while verifiable threshold
cryptography allows the easy detection of malicious behav-
ior. However, a node wishing to join the network could be
vulnerable to a MITM attack [134]. This malicious node
could provide the joining node with a false master public key
for which the malicious node has the corresponding master
private key. Fortunately, this attack can be avoided when at
least t nodes transmit the master public key along with the
private key share since a mobile adversary is assumed to
be incapable of simultaneously controlling t network nodes.
Furthermore, the FD-PKG-based approach is vulnerable to
a Sybil attack [87]. In the Sybil attack a malicious user
takes on multiple (in this case at least t) identities, thereby
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representing multiple nodes of which each has the ability
to obtain a share derived from the master private key. For
example, the malicious user could purchase t mobile devices
and register these with different network providers in order
to successfully register t devices and obtain t shares. This
would allow the malicious user to recreate the entire master
private key and break security within the system. This attack
can be prevented by implementing policies, such as limiting
the distribution of shares to one share per identity (which
can be maintained through identity authentication) instead
of one share per mobile device/SIM. Moreover, ID-PKC is
known to suffer from the key escrow problem. This becomes
problematic when an adversary is able to reconstruct the mas-
ter private key, since this enables the adversary to compute
a node’s private key and therefore break the security of the
entire system. CB-PKC and CL-PKC do not suffer from the
key escrow problem, meaning that backward secrecy is still
protected against. However, it is assumed that no adversary
is able to collect at least t master private key shares within a
share refreshing period.
The scalability requirement is met. Although the proposed
master key-pair generation process does not scale to large
groups, this is not necessary during the network initializa-
tion phase. A large group during network initialization even
increases the chances that a malicious node is involved in
the initialization process. Additionally, scalable mechanism
presented in other distributed authority-based schemes could
be adopted [137]–[140]. This provides scalability from an
overhead perspective. Furthermore, nodes are able to join and
leave the network at any time without posing issues related to
security or connectivity.
The sustainability requirement is conditionally met even
though the initial proposal by Deng et al. [171] and
Deng and Agrawal [172] does not include proactive
threshold cryptography to prevent a mobile adversary
from collecting at least t shares of the master private
key over time. Mechanisms introduced in the other dis-
tributed authority-based approaches which include proac-
tive threshold cryptography [93], [134], [137]–[140], [183]
can be adopted to provide resiliency against mobile adver-
saries for this key management approach. This provides sus-
tainability in this key management approach from a security
perspective. Furthermore, an increased network lifetime does
not worsen issues related to connectivity or overhead.
No issues have been identified related to the connectivity,
overhead, fairness and secure routing independence require-
ment. Based on these evaluations, the authors believe that the
FD-PKG-based key management approach has potential to
provide efficient and effective key management to support
cryptographic protocols to secure a network of mobile small
cells.
VI. CERTIFICATELESS KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was intro-
duced by Al-Riyami and Paterson et al. [41] in 2003. It was
introduced as an alternative to CB-PKC, which suffers from
expensive certificate management, and ID-PKC, which suf-
fers from the key escrow problem. It could be described as
a hybrid between CB-PKC and ID-PKC attempting to only
keep the benefits of each scheme. Therefore, a network node
uses two key pairs to establish secure communication. It first
creates a mathematically linked key pair, similar to a key
pair used in CB-PKC, while also using its identity as a sec-
ond public key and its corresponding private key obtained
from the TTP. This TTP is called a Key Generation Center
(KGC). A network node wishing to communicate with the
key pair owner would request the (certificateless) public key
and uses this key along with the owner’s identity to establish
secure communication. The (certificateless) public key does
not require authentication from a TTP since an adversary
is unable to benefit from a key replacement attack due to
the adversary not having access to the identity-based private
key. At the same time, the mathematically linked private key
is only known to the network node which prevents the key
escrow problem. The design by Al-Riyami and Paterson [41]
limits key management algorithms to ECC [42], therefore
Baek et al. [184] and Lai and Kou [185] proposed their own
CL-PKC designs which does not have this limitation.
This chapter discusses two key management approaches
relying on CL-PKC. The partially distributed KGC-based
approach and the fully distributed KGC-based approach.
A. PARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED KGC-BASED KEY
MANAGEMENT
The partially distributed KGC-based approach (PD-KGC)
was introduced by Zhang et al. in [136]. This approach dis-
tributes the trust from an ordinary centralized KGC to a
proper subset of network nodes and is therefore called par-
tially distributed.
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The general idea of the PD-KGC-based key management
approach is distributing the trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to a proper subset of nodes inside the net-
work. The network is initialized by a KGC and n nodes.
The KGC first generates a master public key and a mas-
ter private key after which it authenticates the n nodes and
provides them with an ID-based private key such that every
node is able to create their public-private key pair. During
the authentication process, the KGC selects k nodes which
it deems to be trustworthy and provides these nodes with
shares of the master private key created from a t-out-of-k
(t ≤ k ≤ n) threshold cryptography scheme [186]. These
distributed KGC-nodes are able to provide key management
services. The offlineKGC leaves the network and the network
initialization process is complete.When a new node wishes to
join the network, it has to contact at least a threshold t number
of KGC-nodes to obtain its ID-based private key from which
it can construct its public-private key pair. When a KGC-node
leaves the network, a set of at least t active KGC-nodes select
a random network node to replace the leaving KGC-node.
The KGC-nodes provide the replacement node with its own
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FIGURE 11. Illustration of the three main phases in the partially distributed key generation center-based approach. (a) Network initialization phase.
(b) Private key issuing phase. (c) KGC node replacement phase.
master private key share, such that there are k KGC-nodes
active within the network during the entire network lifetime.
Zhang et al. [136] provides detailed algorithms for the vari-
ous key management services and they are based on the work
by Al-Riyami and Paterson [41].
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of three main phases. The network
initialization phase, the private key issuing phase, and the
distributed KGC-node replacement phase. In the first phase,
the network initialization phase, there is an offline KGC and
n nodes which will initialize the network. Out of these n
nodes, k nodes are selected to form the distributed KGC.
First, the offline KGC executes a setup algorithm which
generates the master public key and the master private key.
Then, the offline KGC uses the master private key to create
an ID-based private key for each node and uses a t-out-of-
k threshold cryptography scheme [186] to divide the master
private key into k shares. The offline KGC distributes these
shares among k of the n nodes and the ID-based private keys
among all n nodes. This process is illustrated in Fig. 11(a).
Finally, the KGC publishes the master public key and goes
offline. Each node can now create their own public-private
key pair. The following two phases are performed during the
entire lifetime of the network.
The second phase, the private key issuing phase, is trig-
gered when a new node wishes to join the network. This
node contacts t KGC-nodes requesting shares of its ID-based
private key. Each contacted KGC-node authenticates the join-
ing node, creates a share of the node’s ID-based private key
and transmits this to that node. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 11(b). Once the joining node obtains t shares of its
ID-based private key, it combines them to create its ID-based
private key. Detailed algorithms can be found in [136] and are
based on Al-Riyami et al.’s work [41]. An adversary could
still replace un-authenticated public keys to perform a denial-
of-decryption attack. This attack wastes network resources
and [187], [188] proposed to bind the public key of a node
to its identity and their ID-based private key to counter this.
Furthermore, shares of ID-based private keys are claimed
to be distributable over public channels since eavesdroppers
would not learn anything from the node’s combined private
key [187], [188]. However, security can be broken when an
eavesdropper learns about the ID-based private key and suc-
cessfully performs a key replacement attack on the same
node’s public key.
The third phase, the distributed KGC-node replacement
phase, is triggered when a KGC-node leaves the net-
work. When a KGC-node leaves the network, a random
non-KGC-node is selected to take its place. Other
KGC-nodes create a partial master private key share using
their own shares. These partial shares are then distributed
to the selected non-KGC-node which combines them into
its own master private key share. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 11(c). This phase ensures that there are always k online
KGC-nodes available to provide key management services.
It is not specified how a leaving KGC-node is detected or
how the KGC-nodes select a non-KGC-node to replace the
leaving KGC-node.
Key revocation mechanisms are proposed in [189], [190].
When a node detects malicious behavior it transmits an
accusation message to the KGC-nodes. A certain threshold
of accusations against the accused node is required in [189]
before KGC-nodes start to cooperate to generate a revocation
message and flood the network with it. Each node verifies the
revocation message and records the identity of the revoked
node in its memory.
No scheme within this approach mentions a master pri-
vate key share updating mechanism to prevent a mobile
adversary [118] from collecting t master private key shares
and reconstructing the master private key.
Many of the mentioned schemes rely on ECC which
suffers from computationally expensive pairing operations.
To reduce the amount of pairing operations [191]–[194] pro-
posed schemes which combine ECC with RSA.
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is met since trust is distributed
throughout the network and the proper creation of ID-based
private keys can be verified with the master public key.
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Proactive threshold cryptography could be adopted from pre-
viously proposed schemes [93], [134], [137]–[140] to pro-
vide robustness against mobile adversaries while verifiable
threshold cryptography could be adopted from previously
proposed schemes [93], [137] to allow easy detection ofmali-
cious behavior. However, a node wishing to join the network
could be vulnerable to a MITM attack [134]. A malicious
node could provide the joining nodewith a falsemaster public
key for which the malicious node has the corresponding
master private key. Fortunately, this attack can be avoided
when t KGC-nodes transmit the master public key along with
the ID-based private key share.
The scalability requirement is not met. The scalability of
the network is strongly related to the number of KGC-nodes
acting as the distributed KGC since these KGC-nodes must
provide all the network nodes with key management services.
A growth in the number of network nodes also increases
the pressure on these KGC-nodes and subsequently reducing
its battery life. It is reasonable to assume that the num-
ber of nodes in the mobile small cells fluctuate over time
and could drastically increase in certain areas during sport-
ing events, concerts and national celebrations. The limited
amount of KGC-nodes could become incapable of provid-
ing key management services at this point. This scheme is
therefore not considered scalable from a connectivity per-
spective. Temporary on-demand auxiliary KGC-nodes could
be adopted as a solution, as proposed in the PD-CA-based
approach [109], [135].
The sustainability requirement is conditionally met even
though the initial proposal by Zhang et al. [136] does not
include proactive threshold cryptography. Mechanisms intro-
duced in the other distributed authority-based approaches
which include proactive threshold cryptography [93], [134],
[137]–[140], [183] can be adopted to provide resiliency
against mobile adversaries. This provides sustainability in
this key management approach from a security perspective.
Furthermore, an increased network lifetime does not worsen
issues related to connectivity or overhead.
The fairness requirement is not met due to the imbalance
of overhead between network nodes. Even if PKG-nodes
are replaced periodically in an attempt to fairly distributed
the key management tasks and its associated overhead
over time, user’s mobile devices which are temporar-
ily assigned as a PKG-node may still choose to act
selfishly.
No issues have been identified related to the connectiv-
ity, overhead and secure routing independence requirement.
Based on these evaluations, the authors believe that the
PD-KGC-based key management approach will not be able
to provide efficient and effective key management to support
cryptographic protocols to secure a network of mobile small
cells.
B. FULLY DISTRIBUTED KGC-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
The fully distributed PKG-based approach (FD-PKG) was
introduced by Li et al. in [183]. This approach distributes the
trust from an ordinary centralized PKG evenly among all the
network nodes and is therefore called fully distributed.
1) SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The general idea of the FD-KGC-based key management
approach is distributing the trust from a single centralized
trusted authority to all the nodes inside the network. The
network is initialized by n nodes which collectively gen-
erate the master public key and master private key. At the
end of network initialization, each node has a share of the
master private key which they can use to create ID-based
private keys to authenticated nodes and provide new master
private key shares to nodes joining the network. To prevent
any malicious nodes from creating false keying information,
verifiable threshold cryptography [103], [195], [196] is pro-
posed to authenticate keying information. To prevent mobile
adversaries [118] from collecting enough master private key
shares and compromise the system, proactive threshold cryp-
tography is proposed [98].
2) SYSTEM DETAILS
This system consists of three main phases. The network ini-
tialization phase, the node joining phase, and the share updat-
ing phase. In the first phase, the network initialization phase,
n nodes initialize the network following Pedersen’s thresh-
old cryptography scheme without a trusted authority [195].
In this process, every node create its own secret, the cor-
responding witness values and a subshare for every other
node. The witness values are broadcasted and the individual
subshares are securely exchanged. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 12(a). The nodes use the witness values to verify the
correctness of the obtained subshares and once a node obtains
enough subshares, it combines them into its master private
key share. Li et al. [183] does not discuss how each node
obtains the master public key. A solution to this was proposed
in [197], stating that each node creates their master public
key share from their master private key share and broadcasts
this. Each node combines t master public key shares into
the master public key. In [136], [198], [199] the presence of
a TTP is assumed which generates the master key pair and
distributes shares of the master private key among the initial
network nodes to initialize the network.
After each node obtains a share of the master private key,
they create a mathematically linked public-private key pair
and publishes the public key. A node then contacts its neigh-
boring nodes and requests shares for its ID-based private key.
Once this node obtains t valid shares it combines them (and its
mathematically linked private key) into its combined private
key. The following two phases are performed during the entire
lifetime of the network.
The second phase, the node joining phase, is triggered
when a new node wishes to join the network. This node
creates a mathematically linked public-private key pair and
publishes the public key. Then, the node wishing to join
the network presents its identity, public key, and some other
required physical proof to at least t network nodes and
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FIGURE 12. Illustration of the three main phases in the fully distributed key generation center-based approach. (a) Network initialization phase. (b) Node
joining phase. (c) Share updating phase.
requests shares of its ID-based private key and partial shares
of its master private key. Each contacted node needs to verify
the identity of the requestor prior to sending any keying infor-
mation. If the identity verification succeeds, the contacted
node generates a share of the ID-based private key, generates
a partial share of the master private key, encrypts these using
the requestor’s public key, and transmits the encrypted keying
information along with the master public key. This process is
illustrated in Fig. 12(b). In [197] the existence of a trusted
authority is assumed which decides whether a node may join
the network. This effectively removes the identity verification
process by the contacted KGC-nodes.
Once the joining node receives at least t responses,
it decrypts and verifies the keying information. The t correct
shares of the ID-based private keys will be combined to create
the ID-based private key which in turn is combined with the
node’s mathematically linked private key to create its full
private key. The partial shares of the master private key are
combined to create its own master private key share. The new
node is now capable of decrypting any received messages
which were encrypted with its public key and identity, and it
can provide key management service to other joining nodes.
In [198], [199] it is argued that the initially obtained keys
should act as the personal master key only to be used in a
key derivation function to create keys which will be used for
cryptographic applications.
An interesting idea is discussed in [197]. It proposes that
themaster key pair should continue to consist of contributions
made by each node within the network. This means that a
node which joins the network creates its own secret, generates
subshares for every node already inside the network and
distributes these securely to them. Each node then updates
their master private key share and generates a subshare for the
joining node which it combines into its own master private
key share. Master public key shares are also shared and
updated. Similarly, when a node leaves the network, the node
announces its departure and the remaining network nodes
remove its contribution from the master private key share
and master public key. This scheme updates keys upon mem-
bership changes of the network. However, this comes with
additional communication and memory storage overhead of
which the expense increases exponentially with the size of the
network.
The third phase, the share updating phase, is proposed
to protect the system against mobile adversaries. Such an
adversary compromises nodes one at a time in order to collect
t master private key shares such that it can reconstruct the
master private key and compromise the system. It is assumed
that a mobile adversary can only collect t− 1 shares between
any consecutive share updating phase. Therefore, the share
refreshing phase is initiated by t nodes and uses verifiable
threshold cryptography to detect any malicious behavior.
These t nodes each select a random update polynomial and
securely send an update subshare for every node within the
network. This process is illustrated in Fig. 12(c). When a
node receives these t update subshares, it combines these
into a full update subshare and then with the original master
private key share to create a new master private key share.
This master private key share is independent of the previous
share which means that a mobile adversary is unable to use
formerly collected master private key shares and uncover the
master private key.
A key revocation mechanism is proposed in [190] and
is triggered once malicious behavior at a network node is
detected. A coalition of t nodes generate partial revocation
messages and the assigned coalition leader combines these
partial revocations. The coalition leader then distributes the
revocation message to all the nodes within the network. Each
node verifies the validity of the revocation message and,
if correct, stores the identity of the malicious node to deny
any future communication with it.
To establish secure communication [183], [190] proposed
an interactive key agreement scheme while [136], [197] pro-
posed an encryption and decryption scheme. In each of these
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schemes the public key of the other node is requested and
verified as a valid public key. However, the public keys
do not seem to be bound to the node’s identity and these
schemes may therefore be vulnerable to a key replacement
attack [188] which disrupts communication and wastes net-
work resources.
3) EVALUATION FOR MOBILE SMALL CELLS
The security requirement is met as long as the initial n nodes
initializing the network are well-behaving. Verifiable thresh-
old cryptography allows the detection of malicious behavior
and proactive threshold cryptography provides robustness
against mobile adversaries. However, a node wishing to join
the network could be vulnerable to a MITM attack [134].
A malicious node could provide the joining node with a
false master public key for which the malicious node has the
corresponding master private key. Fortunately, this attack can
be avoided when t nodes transmit the master public key along
with the private key share. Furthermore, the FD-KGC-based
approach is vulnerable to a Sybil attack [87]. In the Sybil
attack, a malicious user takes on multiple identities, thereby
representing multiple nodes, to gather enough master public
key shares to break security. For example, this malicious
user could purchase t mobile devices and register these with
different network providers in order to successfully register t
devices and obtain t shares. This would allow the malicious
user to recreate the entire master private key. This attack can
be prevented by implementing policies, such as limiting the
distribution of shares to one share per identity (which can
be maintained through identity authentication) instead of one
share per mobile device/SIM.
The scalability requirement is met. Although the proposed
master key-pair generation process does not scale to large
groups, this is not necessary during the network initializa-
tion phase. A large group during network initialization even
increases the chances that a malicious node is involved in
the process. Additionally, the proposed share updating mech-
anism requires a flood of t subshares throughout the entire
network, whereas the proposal in [137]–[140] only floods
the network with an update polynomial. This mechanism
could potentially be adopted to minimize the communication
overhead. Then, this scheme provides scalability from an
overhead perspective. Furthermore, nodes are able to join and
leave the network at any time without posing issues related to
security or connectivity.
No issues have been identified related to the connectivity,
overhead, sustainability, fairness and secure routing indepen-
dence requirement. Based on these evaluations, the authors
believe that the FD-KGC-based key management approach
has potential to provide efficient and effective key manage-
ment to support cryptographic protocols to secure a network
of mobile small cells.
VII. SYMMETRIC KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
In symmetric key cryptography (SKC), a set of network
nodes wishing to securely communicate with each other are
providedwith a shared keywhich they use for both encryption
and decryption purposes. The secrecy of this shared key,
being only known by the involved network nodes, provides
security in this family of cryptographic key management.
Two main advantages of symmetric keys over asymmetric
keys (used in PKC) is that each key does not require as many
bits while providing similar amounts of security and that
cryptographic primitives, such as encryption and decryption
schemes like AES [200], are computationally more efficient
and therefore also more energy efficient. However, this gen-
erally comes at the expense of flexibility in areas such as
scalability and dynamic membership which are important
characteristics of ad hoc networks. The advantages of sym-
metric key management are particularly helpful to resource
restricted devices such as wireless sensors such that many key
management proposals for dynamic sensor networks (DSNs)
attempt to mitigate the disadvantages of having to resort to
symmetric key management. These resource restrictions do
not apply to the user equipments considered in our scenario
architecture, MANETs and ad hoc D2D networks and can
therefore enjoy the flexibilities offered by PKC. Yet, some
symmetric key management schemes have been proposed
for MANETs and ad hoc D2D networks while attempting
to mitigate some of the disadvantages. There are three main
classes of organizing the symmetric key management such
that network nodes can establish their shared keys in an
authenticated manner, namely key pre-distribution, key dis-
tribution and key agreement.
A. KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
This class of symmetric key management schemes, inde-
pendently introduced by Blom [201] and Matsumoto and
Imai [202], is organized by a TTP named theKeyDistribution
Center (KDC). This KDC provides each network node with
long-lived symmetric keys during the network initialization
phase. These keys are generally used to create pairwise keys
to secure P2P communication. The exact pre-distribution of
keys depends on the security requirements of the network.
For a network which requires strong security, the KDCwould
distribute a pairwise key for every pair of network nodes.
Every node in a network of n nodes will therefore obtain
n−1 pairwise keys which causes a highmemory requirement.
However, any pair of nodes which has not been compro-
mised by an adversary is guaranteed to remain secure. A net-
work which does not require such strong security standards
can use alternative key pre-distribution schemes in order
to reduce the memory requirement. These schemes provide
security against eavesdroppers as long as a certain thresh-
old of network nodes are not colluding and have not been
compromised [203].
Once every node is provided with keying material, network
initialization is complete and every pair of nodes can use
their symmetric keys to establish a secure communications
channel between each other. During this time, the KDC is
considered to be offline. This is the only class of sym-
metric key management that is resilient against dynamic
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topological changes inside the network [204], [205] while the
offline KDC prevents adversaries from having to compromise
only a single target to compromise the security of the entire
network. However, a problem occurs when nodes wish to
join the network during network deployment. These nodes
are unable to establish pairwise keys with nodes which are
already part of the network. Suppose that the new nodes are
able to obtain keying material in an offline fashion from
the KDC prior to joining the network, the offline KDC is
still unable to provide the online nodes with keying mate-
rial such that they can authenticate the joining nodes and
establish a secure communications channel with them. Thus,
the class of key pre-distribution-based key management is
unable to support certain membership changes in dynamic ad
hoc networks [36], [37].
Two works [204], [205] proposing a key management
scheme for DSNs based their schemes on key pre-distribution
and claim that key pre-distribution is the only practical option
out of the three classes of symmetric key management.
Chan [206], [207] used this advice when he proposed a key
management scheme for a MANET in which he attempted
to solve the disadvantage of membership changes inherent
in key pre-distribution schemes. He introduced the use of a
large public set of private keys of which nodes would select a
random subset for personal use. Chan provided a shared-key
discovery protocol in which network nodes interactively can
discover which private keys they have in common while
preventing one another from revealing the private keys that
they do not have in common. These shared keys would then
be used to secure communication between these nodes. Chan
claimed that his scheme has a high probability that users
share at least one private key with each other while providing
resiliency against colluding (or compromised) network nodes
attempting to uncover shared private keys between other
nodes. Goratti et al. [208] proposed a similar approach to
secure communications for an ad hoc D2D network. Unfortu-
nately, Wu and Wei [209] pointed out a flaw which nullifies
Chan’s claim and shows that either a high probability of a
shared private key can be guaranteed or resiliency against
colluding network nodes but not both at the same timemaking
the approach impractical. No other symmetric key manage-
ment scheme based on key pre-distribution has been found
which would make a suitable candidate to secure a network
of mobile small cells.
B. KEY DISTRIBUTION-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
This class of symmetric key management schemes is also
organized by a KDC. Each node wishing to participate in the
network contacts the KDC in an offline and secure fashion to
obtain a shared private key. This shared private key enables
each node to establish a secure channel with the KDC dur-
ing network deployment. When a network node wishes to
securely communicate with another network node (or a group
of network nodes) it contacts the online KDC and follows an
interactive protocol which results in each of these network
nodes obtaining a temporary common key. The class of key
distribution schemes therefore establishes keys on demand
and it supports both P2P key management schemes as well
as group key management schemes.
Key distribution schemes have the advantage that every
network node is only required to store a single long-lived
symmetric key which they share with the KDC and there-
fore does not suffer from a large memory requirement as
might be the case in a key pre-distribution scheme. How-
ever, key distribution schemes have several issues in a
dynamic ad hoc environment. Several key distribution-based
schemes [210]–[214] proposed for an ad hoc network rely on
the online centralized KDC to organize the key management
which is not only difficult to support but it also poses a secu-
rity risk. DoS attacks couldmake the keymanagement service
unavailable and a compromise of the KDC would compro-
mise all the keys that it issues. An ad hoc network could
overcome this single-point-of-attack by selecting a group of
online network nodes to perform the task of the KDC as is
proposed in [215] but in order to establish trust this scheme
relies on an underlying public keymanagement scheme. Even
if a centralized or a decentralized KDC could be supported
and secured against malicious attacks, it may still not be
able to set up secure communication between nodes due
to communication range limitations, network partition and
link breakages caused by node movement or the unknown
network topology prior to network deployment. No symmet-
ric key management scheme based on key distribution has
been found which does not rely on a centralized KDC or an
underlying public keymanagement scheme tomake a suitable
candidate to secure a network of mobile small cells.
C. KEY AGREEMENT-BASED KEY MANAGEMENT
In the class of key agreement schemes, multiple network
nodes contact each other to establish a shared symmetric key.
These nodes follow an interactive protocol in which each
node contributes some secret input in the creation of this
key. This key can then be used to secure communication.
The major advantage of this scheme is that the interactive
protocol is fully distributed, self-organized and it does not
rely on a TTP. However, this class of schemes also comes
with drawbacks.
The interactive protocol is not robust against the topolog-
ical changes and link breakages which occur in networks
with a dynamic topology. This is especially troublesome for
the establishment of a shared group key since this requires
more time and more message exchanges to complete the
protocol. Furthermore, key agreement schemes would also
require support of a routing infrastructure since it is likely
that two nodes wishing to communicate are not within each
other’s transmission range and therefore have to rely on
intermediate nodes forwarding messages. As already dis-
cussed, secure routing is not available at this stage which
means that these protocols are vulnerable to MITM attacks.
The only way to prevent MITM attacks is by combining
the key agreement scheme with a mutual authentication
scheme. These are also called authenticated key agreement
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TABLE 3. Evaluation and comparison table of described key management approaches.
schemes (AKAS). Shen et al. [216] proposed to include a
short visual or verbal message for the purpose of mutual
authentication. Unfortunately, identity and location privacy
issues arise from this ordinary form of mutual authenti-
cation. Anonymous mutual authentication is necessary to
tackle these issues. However, anonymous mutual authentica-
tion relies on a pre-established secret between the network
nodes. This pre-established secret is provided by an underly-
ing key pre-distribution scheme [217], [218], key distribution
scheme (also known as a trusted server scheme) or public key
cryptography-based scheme (also known as a self-enforcing
scheme) [219]–[223]. Due to this reliance on an underlying
key management scheme, key agreement schemes are not
explored further in this article.
VIII. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF KEY
MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
Based upon an extensive evaluation, we summarized
in Table 3 the key management approaches and their abilities
to satisfy each proposed requirement. It is clear that many
key management approaches fail to satisfy every proposed
requirement to secure a network of mobile small cells. How-
ever, some failed requirements could potentially be resolved
by proposed solutions. This chapter compares the evaluation
of each key management approach and highlights the main
drawbacks and its ability to overcome these in order to be
considered as a candidate to secure the mobile small cells
network.
The certificate chaining-based approach [53], [54] is con-
sidered insecure due to its reliance of transitive trust.
We demand a high level of security which this approach is
unable to satisfy. Furthermore, if transitive trust is considered
secure for an alternative ad hoc network use case, the reliance
on secure routing to exchange certificate repositories still
poses a problem.
The mobility-based approach [85], [86] is only considered
conditionally secure. Again, this is due to its reliance on
transitive trust. By eliminating mechanisms to exchange key-
ing material which rely on transitive trust, keying material
can only be obtained through mobility and close-proximity
authentication. This not only leaves us with a highly dis-
connected network, it also causes issues related to overhead
and scalability. This approach has the potential to satisfy six
individual requirements, however it is unable to satisfy all
of these at the same time. Furthermore, it is not realistic
to have device owners exchange keying material based on
mobility when they could simply rely on existing network
infrastructure to connect them.
The self-certification-based approach [91] generates a
tremendous amount of communication overhead in a dense
and highly dynamic network due to its neighborhood mon-
itoring process. This provides security and connectivity but
cannot simply be adjusted without breaking the entire key
management. This is the major drawback which makes this
approach unlikely to efficiently secure a network of mobile
small cells.
The pre-distribution-based approach [155], [156] is out-
right insecure due to the exchange of identities, essentially
public keys, which have no means of verification. This could
be resolved by secure routing, however this is not possible
at this stage. If a solution to this problem can be found, then
the pre-distribution-based approach still requires an efficient
mechanism which deals with nodes leaving the network.
All of the partially distributed TTP-based approaches
(PD-CA [93], PD-PKG [134], PD-KGC [136]) suffer from
the asymmetric relationship and workload of the network
nodes. This asymmetry promotes free-riding and could crip-
ple the keymanagement and its provided security of the entire
network. Stimulating cooperation mechanisms will therefore
be increasingly difficult to develop.
Almost all of the fully distributed TTP-based approaches
(FD-CA [137]–[140], FD-PKG [171], [172], FD-KGC [136],
[183]) satisfy every requirement and has the potential to
satisfy these at the same time. Security challenges can be
overcome while these approaches provide connectivity, scal-
ability, sustainability, fairness, and routing independence.
However, the FD-CA-based approach suffers from a compar-
atively large communication overhead due to the certificate
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management and distribution. These approaches are based
on a MANET architecture. The adoption of this approach
for mobile small cells provides opportunities when it comes
to the key management and routing since assistance from
the network infrastructure is available. Overall, the fully
distributed TTP is considered an approach worth pursuing
to secure a network of mobile small cells.
IX. KEY MANAGEMENT FOR NETWORK
CODING-ENABLED NETWORKS
A network coding-enabled network allows the encoding of
data at routers and the decoding at the receiver. Network
coding, introduced by Ahlswede et al. in [25], provides sig-
nificant benefits to networks in terms of bandwidth, energy
consumption, delay and robustness. Despite these advan-
tages, networks utilizing the network coding technology are
vulnerable to the so-called pollution attack. In this attack,
a malicious user controls a router and mutates data by pol-
luting them. Network coding causes this pollution to spread
downstream by encoding correct data with polluted data.
This leads to the inability to properly decode and retrieve
the information at the receiver. Pollution attacks therefore
waste many costly network resources. Data integrity schemes
are required to prevent any polluted data from being trans-
mitted any further through the network. However, this is
only possible if the source node provides every intermediate
node with a piece of verifiable information and therefore
must share a cryptography key with them. The research com-
munity proposed various integrity schemes [224]–[232], but
they all rely on an efficient key management scheme. Also,
in order to utilize network coding there must exist at least two
intertwined multihop paths between the source node and the
destination node. The most important requirement of a key
management scheme for network coding-enabled networks
is therefore connectivity.
X. OPEN RESEARCH CHALLENGES
This survey has identified two open research challenges
related to designing a suitable key management scheme to
secure a network of mobile small cells.
Keymanagement schemes relying on a partially distributed
TTP require a rigorous procedure for selecting the most suit-
able network nodes to act as the distributed TTP. The selected
nodes could be random, based on physical security and com-
putational ability [105]–[111], trustworthiness [112], [113],
restrictedmobility, maximum clique [114], [115] or any other
parameter. Furthermore, nodes acting as the distributed TTP
require a replacement procedure if any decide to leave the
network. The aim of the researchers should be to prevent
the selected nodes from acting selfishly due to the overhead
burden, while the key management services are provided
with limited delay. The many considerations in the selection
procedure keeps this process an open research area.
Due to the lack of network infrastructure in MANETs,
key management schemes designed for this type of network
relies on physical contact to instantiate trust and distribute
keys. This form of authentication to secure communication
is not realistic in a network of mobile small cells, since net-
work users could utilize the existing network infrastructure.
Network nodes wishing to authenticate each other online
therefore seem to require assistance from the network infras-
tructure. Authentication schemes to secure D2D communi-
cations have been proposed [23], [214], but it assumes the
network infrastructure to be secure against compromise.
An authentication scheme between these parties which pre-
vents distribution of sensitive and private data over insecure
channels is an open research area.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Covering the urban landscape with mobile small cells, as pro-
posed by the EU funded H2020-MSCA project ‘‘SECRET’’,
optimizes network services such as data rates, energy effi-
ciency, latency, and interference in a cost-effective fashion.
In this network architecture, we do not assume the existence
of an online centralized TTP which is resilient against com-
promise. We believe that the network infrastructure is unable
to act as the trust anchor since network infrastructure could
potentially be physically broken into such that transmissions
of cryptographic keying material can be falsified or that
network infrastructure can become unavailable to perform
key management services due to denial-of-service attacks.
Therefore, a key management scheme which provides secure
communication between mobile devices within a network of
mobile small cells is required to decentralize trust and must
therefore be self-organized during network deployment.
In this article, we have studied ten key management
schemes which attempt to distribute trust. All of these are
based on PKC, of which five key management approaches
rely on CB-PKC, three key management approaches rely
on ID-PKC, and two key management approaches rely on
CL-PKC. No key management scheme based on symmet-
ric key cryptography has been found which successfully
removes the necessity of an online centralized TTP. This arti-
cle explores each studied key management approach exten-
sively by including many works proposing improvements,
adjustments or extensions of the original proposal. This cre-
ates a deep understanding of each key management approach
and their potential when it comes to its adoptability into the
proposed scenario architecture.
Self-organized key management schemes must satisfy
seven proposed requirements in order to become eligible for
adoptability. These requirements cover security, connectivity,
overhead, scalability, sustainability, fairness and secure rout-
ing independence. Each key management approach has been
evaluated for these seven requirements and we have found
that only the FD-PKG-based key management approach
and the FD-KGC-based key management approach have the
potential to satisfy all of them. The other key management
approaches were evaluated to be unfitting to properly secure
the network of mobile small cells due to drawbacks to which
no solution may exist. Therefore, as a future work we plan
to design a novel key management scheme utilizing ideas
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proposed in the FD-PKG-based and the FD-KGC-based key
management approach.
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